ILNews

COA orders new trial for overly talkative defendant

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

In a divided opinion, the Indiana Court of Appeals has reversed a trial court’s denial of motion for mistrial, holding that the court went too far in physically preventing a defendant from speaking.

Kenneth Vaughn was charged with Class D felony robbery and other charges for allegedly robbing a bank in Merrillville. During a three-day trial in 2008, court records show that Vaughn repeatedly presented then withdrew requests to represent himself. On the final day of trial, Vaughn took the stand, and rather than answer his attorney’s open-ended question about events on the day of the robbery, Vaughn instead began criticizing his attorney.

Lake Superior Judge Thomas Stefaniak, Jr. interrupted at least four times, instructing Vaughn to stop talking. Vaughn continued talking about his attorney, and the judge ordered the jury to be removed from the courtroom. While the jury was still present, the bailiff put his hand over Vaughn’s mouth and handcuffed him.

With the jury out of the courtroom, the judge spoke to Vaughn, expressing his frustration that Vaughn had been “flimflamming back and forth” about whether to represent himself and saying that he believed Vaughn may have been trying to cause a mistrial all along. After that conversation, the bailiff removed Vaughn’s handcuffs, and the jury and all parties returned to the courtroom. Vaughn then answered his attorney’s questions without incident.

The jury found Vaughn guilty of Class C felony robbery and Class D felony resisting law enforcement, and the court sentenced him to six years on the first count and two years on the second, to be served consecutively.

In Kenneth Dwayne Vaughn v. State of Indiana, No.45A05-1102-CR-57, Kenneth Vaughn appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his motion for mistrial. The appeals court wrote that in order to grant a mistrial, the defendant must prove that he was placed in “grave peril” – the gravity of which is measured by its persuasive effect on the jury.

Citing Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E. 2d 1179, 1193 (Ind. 2001), the COA held that a defendant should be handcuffed only when he presents a danger to those in the courtroom, to prevent his escape, or to maintain order during trial, because the use of restraints could cause jurors to assume a defendant is guilty.

In Vaughn, the appeals court held that the trial court overreacted to Vaughn’s disruptive comments and that despite his continuous waffling about whether to proceed pro se, he had not previously disrupted proceedings.

The COA majority wrote: “We realize that it sometimes takes superhuman effort to restrain the natural frustration of dealing with difficult people at challenging times. We also recognize that this action is totally out of character for this seasoned and fine trial court judge.” Muzzling and restraining Vaughn, the appeals court held, deprived him of a fair trial before an untainted and impartial jury. It reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Judge Ezra Friedlander dissented, stating that he believed the trial court’s actions in silencing Vaughn were appropriate. Both the trial court and the defense, Friedlander wrote, were concerned that Vaughn was about to make statements on the stand that might cause a mistrial, and no one could predict whether Vaughn would have continued to disregard the judge’s orders to be quiet. Judge Friedlander also wrote that the jury would likely understand the reason for the restraints and would not assume that Vaughn was a dangerous person.

“Whether purposeful or not, he should not be permitted to gain from his willful disregard of the trial court’s commands,” Judge Friedlander wrote. “I would affirm the trial court in all respects.”

 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT