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7th Circuit ends use of inextricable intertwinement doctrine

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The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a defendant’s perjury conviction and in doing so, concluded that resorting to inextricable intertwinement is unavailable when determining a theory of admissibility.

Jamarkus Gorman challenged his perjury conviction after testifying falsely before a grand jury. Gorman’s brother was the subject of drug trafficking and money laundering investigations. Police learned his brother had a Bentley and wanted to seize it as proceeds of the brother’s illegal drug activity. Police met with Gorman at his gated condominium complex and asked if he knew of the Bentley and whether it was stored in the condominium complex’s garage. Gorman said he didn’t know of a Bentley, and lied to police about which parking spots in the garage he owned. After police left because they didn’t see the Bentley, Gorman had several people help him tow the car out of the garage and abandon it. They also pried open the trunk which contained money used to pay accomplices.

When testifying before the grand jury as part of the indictment process for the money laundering charges, Gorman said he never had a Bentley in his garage. Before his perjury trial, the District Court admitted certain witness statements about the car theft and his retrieving money out of the trunk. The District Court concluded the evidence was admissible under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine.

In United States of America v. Jamarkus Gorman No. 09-3010, the Circuit Court spent time analyzing the admission of the evidence and overruled its prior line of cases that allowed for admission using the inextricable intertwinement doctrine.

“There is now so much overlap between the theories of admissibility that the inextricable intertwinement doctrine often serves as the basis for admission even when it is unnecessary,” wrote Judge Michael Kanne. “Thus, although this fine distinction has traditionally existed, the inextricable intertwinement doctrine has since become overused, vague, and quite unhelpful.”

They found the District Court didn’t need to resort to the inextricable intertwinement doctrine to admit the evidence. Even though it was admitted using that doctrine, it made no practical difference to the outcome of admissibility. The judges found the evidence was properly admitted as direct evidence instead and the probative value of that evidence was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect on Gorman.

They also found a little merit in Gorman’s argument that he never “had” the Bentley because he didn’t own it, so he couldn’t have lied on the stand.

“We agree initially with Jamarkus that “to have” has more than one meaning,” wrote Judge Kanne. “But what Jamarkus ignores is that our precedent dictates that even when a question or answer is ambiguous, a conviction may still be upheld if a jury has been called upon ‘to determine that the question as the defendant understood it was falsely answered….’”

There was ample evidence of conduct that is consistent with Gorman’s possession of the Bentley, including his storage of the vehicle and implicit claims he owned the car.
 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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