ILNews

7th Circuit rules on FMLA case

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed a medical-leave decision from an Indianapolis judge who's since joined that appellate bench.

In Steven Peters v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., No. 06-4290, the three-judge panel reversed and remanded the case involving a Family and Medical Leave Act claim. Steven Peters had worked for the pharmaceutical company since 2001 and worked from his home in Indianapolis, marketing products to doctors and healthcare professionals. He injured his neck and shoulder and eventually filed an injury claim in 2002, and then had surgery and took time off from work starting in December 2002.

Eventually, the company decided to replace Peters in April 2003 and Peters sued in federal court on FMLA claims and state claims. The company argued that Peters wasn't eligible for FMLA based on a provision that excluded workers at worksites with less than 50 employees, but Peters argued that he didn't receive the 12 weeks he was required and Gilead was estopped because of employee handbook guidelines detailing the time off.

Judge John D. Tinder, who has since joined the 7th Circuit, concluded that Peters had not established the elements of equitable estoppel and granted summary judgment for Gilead.

The 7th Circuit wrote that Judge Tinder didn't address whether Gilead's promises are actionable as a contract or under promissory estoppel, though it pointed out that it was understandable because the parties focused arguments on a different aspect of the law and the equitable estoppel theory as a means of establishing eligibility under FMLA.

"As we have explained, however, using equitable estoppel to block an employer from asserting a statutory defense to the FMLA liability is not the same as using promissory estoppel to enforce a promise by an employer to allow 12 weeks of medical leave," Judge Diane Sykes wrote. "Promissory estoppel is a well-established state-law remedy; on the other hand, the availability of equitable estoppel to block a statutory defense to FMLA eligibility has been assumed but not decided in this circuit. We think the prudent course is to remand this case for consideration of Gilead's liability under state law."

She added that the leave provisions in Gilead's employee handbook may be enforceable as a contract under Indiana law, and at the least, are promises giving rise to recovery under promissory estoppel.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

  2. wow is this a bunch of bs! i know the facts!

  3. MCBA .... time for a new release about your entire membership (or is it just the alter ego) being "saddened and disappointed" in the failure to lynch a police officer protecting himself in the line of duty. But this time against Eric Holder and the Federal Bureau of Investigation: "WASHINGTON — Justice Department lawyers will recommend that no civil rights charges be brought against the police officer who fatally shot an unarmed teenager in Ferguson, Mo., after an F.B.I. investigation found no evidence to support charges, law enforcement officials said Wednesday." http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/us/justice-department-ferguson-civil-rights-darren-wilson.html?ref=us&_r=0

  4. Dr wail asfour lives 3 hours from the hospital,where if he gets an emergency at least he needs three hours,while even if he is on call he should be in a location where it gives him max 10 minutes to be beside the patient,they get paid double on their on call days ,where look how they handle it,so if the death of the patient occurs on weekend and these doctors still repeat same pattern such issue should be raised,they should be closer to the patient.on other hand if all the death occured on the absence of the Dr and the nurses handle it,the nurses should get trained how to function appearntly they not that good,if the Dr lives 3 hours far from the hospital on his call days he should sleep in the hospital

  5. It's a capital offense...one for you Latin scholars..

ADVERTISEMENT