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A chargeback isn't a sale of insurance

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The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held today that a chargeback for the cost of insurance is not a sale of insurance, as some owner-operators of leased trucks argued. The Circuit Court also took issue with the District judge’s decision on which statute of limitations applied to the parts of the suit.

In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association Inc., et al. v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, No. 08-1679, some owner-operators of trucks leased by Mayflower Transit challenged the company’s policy of reducing price-per-mile payments and other fees by the cost of insurance, a process called chargeback. They argued under 49.U.S.C. Section 14704(a)(2) that a chargeback violates 49 C.F.R. Section 376.12(i), which says “the lessor is not required to purchase or rent any products, equipment, or services from the authorized carrier as a condition of entering into a lease arrangement.” The owner-operators claimed the requirement to reimburse Mayflower for the insurance is the same thing as buying insurance from Mayflower.

U.S. District Judge Sarah Evans Barker dismissed some of the plaintiffs’ claims for relief after finding that the statute of limitations is two years, even though Section 14704(a)(2) didn’t define a period of limitations for suits on its authority. The owner-operators argued that the residual statute of limitations allows for a four-year period.

Judge Barker held that a chargeback for the cost of insurance isn’t a sale of insurance. She also thought the failure of Section 14705(c), which states a two-year statute of limitations under Section 14704(b), but doesn’t mention Section 14704(a)(2), was a scrivener’s error and that it could be corrected by reading the reference to (b) as if it were referring to (a)(2).

This was a problematic approach, wrote Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, because Congress enacted and the president signed a statute that places a two-year limitation on administrative complaints under (b), but left (a)(2) to the four-year residual statute of limitations.

“A judge’s belief that Congress planned to do something different but bollixed the job does not alter what the enacted statute provides,” he wrote. “The Constitution gives the force of law only to what is actually passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President. What Congress meant to do, but didn’t, is not the law.”

Two other Circuit Courts have also addressed this subject and found that (b) must be enforced as written and the period of limitations for suits under (a)(2) is four years.

The 7th Circuit also affirmed that a chargeback is not considered a sale of insurance and does not violate Section 376.12(i). Chief Judge Easterbrook noted that the 8th Circuit reached the same conclusion on chargebacks and no other Court of Appeals has held otherwise. The judges remanded for any further proceedings that may be required by their ruling on the limitations issue.

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  1. Such things are no more elections than those in the late, unlamented Soviet Union.

  2. It appears the police and prosecutors are allowed to change the rules halfway through the game to suit themselves. I am surprised that the congress has not yet eliminated the right to a trial in cases involving any type of forensic evidence. That would suit their foolish law and order police state views. I say we eliminate the statute of limitations for crimes committed by members of congress and other government employees. Of course they would never do that. They are all corrupt cowards!!!

  3. Poor Judge Brown probably thought that by slavishly serving the godz of the age her violations of 18th century concepts like due process and the rule of law would be overlooked. Mayhaps she was merely a Judge ahead of her time?

  4. in a lawyer discipline case Judge Brown, now removed, was presiding over a hearing about a lawyer accused of the supposedly heinous ethical violation of saying the words "Illegal immigrant." (IN re Barker) http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-discipline-2013-55S00-1008-DI-429.pdf .... I wonder if when we compare the egregious violations of due process by Judge Brown, to her chiding of another lawyer for politically incorrectness, if there are any conclusions to be drawn about what kind of person, what kind of judge, what kind of apparatchik, is busy implementing the agenda of political correctness and making off-limits legit advocacy about an adverse party in a suit whose illegal alien status is relevant? I am just asking the question, the reader can make own conclsuion. Oh wait-- did I use the wrong adjective-- let me rephrase that, um undocumented alien?

  5. of course the bigger questions of whether or not the people want to pay for ANY bussing is off limits, due to the Supreme Court protecting the people from DEMOCRACY. Several decades hence from desegregation and bussing plans and we STILL need to be taking all this taxpayer money to combat mostly-imagined "discrimination" in the most obviously failed social program of the postwar period.

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