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Appeals court split on parol evidence issue

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Judges on the Indiana Court of Appeals were split on whether a boss's oral promise to a future employee regarding a severance package would be barred from consideration by the parol evidence rule.

In Mark Hinkel v. Sataria Distribution & Packaging Inc., No. 49A04-0908-CV-473, Judges Nancy Vaidik and Patricia Riley ruled any alleged promises John Jacobs from Sataria made to potential employee Mark Hinkel regarding severance and salary are barred from consideration by the parol evidence rule.

Hinkel worked for a different company when Jacobs approached him about working for Sataria. Hinkel claimed Jacobs promised him in a job offer one year's salary and insurance coverage if Hinkel ever lost his job with Sataria for any reason except if Hinkel quit. Jacobs sent a letter to Hinkel outlining the terms of the employment, but the letter didn't mention the oral agreement, nor did it specify paid vacation time.

Hinkel signed the letter and worked for the company for a little over a year until Sataria terminated his employment. Hinkel sued for breach of contract and/or promissory estoppel, claiming the company owed him the severance package Jacobs promised instead of the six weeks he received. The trial court granted summary judgment for Sataria.

Under the parol evidence rule, the majority found Hinkel's contract represented a complete integration of the parties' employment agreement. Since a lucrative severance provision would normally be included in an employment contract, the omission of it supported the conclusion Hinkel's written contract superseded any prior oral promises, wrote Judge Vaidik. In addition, the majority held that Jacobs' alleged oral promises after Hinkel signed the employment agreement don't constitute a valid contract modification because they weren't supported by an independent, bargained-for exchange.

Judge Terry Crone dissented on the issue of parol evidence because he believed a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the parties intended for Jacobs' written job offer to be completely integrated. The one-page written agreement doesn't contain an integration clause. Judge Crone also found telling the fact the vacation terms were yet to be determined, which he interpreted as meaning the parties hadn't reached an agreement on the issue and the offer is more like a memorandum of understanding.

Also, he believed the terms of the severance package didn't vary from or contradict the terms of the written offer, but merely covered that which wasn't covered in the offer. As such, even assuming that the offer is completely integrated, the terms of the severance package would not be barred by the parol evidence rule, he wrote.

The majority also addressed Hinkel's claim for promissory estoppel and found he failed to show an injury "so independent and severe that injustice could only be avoided by enforcement of Jacobs' alleged promise," wrote Judge Vaidik.

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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