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Appellate judges rule on court warrant officer's claim

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The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled an Anderson City Court judge didn’t wrongly reassign a police warrant officer from his courtroom because the two didn’t share an employee-employer relationship that would allow for a suit under the Indiana Wage Claim Statute.

A unanimous ruling came Tuesday in Mark McCann v. The City of Anderson, Indiana and The Hon. Donald Phillippe, No. 48A02-1009-PL-1060, involving an Anderson Police Department officer who became a warrant officer for the city court in 1998, about three years after his police service began. Judge Donald Phillippe presided over that court, and Mark McCann’s duties included receiving all court warrants issued, maintaining computer files of each wanted person and all probationers, and issuing reports to his supervisors in the police department. While serving as warrant officer, McCann discovered that a probation officer with similar duties was receiving a paycheck from both the APD and City Court.

In 2005, Judge Phillippe requested that McCann be reassigned based on reports that he was “rude and inappropriate” with defendants and prisoners in the courtroom. He was reassigned to a different police department division, and complaints he lodged were dismissed for having no merit. In December 2006 he filed a claim against the city and judge. Special Judge Mary Willis for the Madison Superior Court granted summary judgment for the city and court, finding that McCann wasn’t an employee who could bring a claim under the state’s wage statute.

That statute specifically states, “Whenever any employer separates any employee from the pay-roll, the unpaid wages or compensation of such employee shall become due and payable at regular pay day for pay period in which separation occurred.”

Analyzing whether that employer-employee relationship existed in this case, the appellate panel looked at factors such as the right to discharge, mode of payment, supplying tools or equipment, belief of the parties about that relationship, control over the means used in the results reached, the length of employment, and establishment of the work boundaries.

Though some factors indicated McCann was an employee, the court ultimately decided he was not. Most importantly, the court analyzed the right of the employer to exercise control over the employee and determined that McCann remained under the supervision and control of the Anderson Police Department.

“Thus, overall, four of the seven factors, including the most important ‘Control over the Means Used’ indicate that McCann was not an employee of the City Court,” Judge Melissa May wrote. “Because the City Court was not McCann’s employer, he cannot be due any ‘unpaid wages’ from the City Court. Therefore, he cannot assert a claim against the City Court under the Indiana Wage Statute. Accordingly, we affirm.”

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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