Justices split on transfer of noncompete case

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Two Indiana Supreme Court justices disagreed with their colleagues in not accepting an appeal, finding that a ruling from the state's intermediate appellate court muddled caselaw on medical business and noncompete agreements, and significantly jeopardizes the public's access to medical care.

In a seven-page dissent authored by Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard and joined by Justice Brent Dickson, the two jurists get into why they would have granted transfer in the case of Mercho-Roushdi-Shoemaker-Dilley Thoraco-Vascular Corp. (MRSD) v. James W. Blatchford, III, M.D., and Eve G. Cieutat, No. 84A01-0801-CV-30.

The Feb. 5, 2009, Court of Appeals decision involves the enforceability of a noncompete agreement between doctors and a physicians' group, and this transfer denial keeps in place that holding that could significantly impact Indiana's medical community.

Originating from Vigo Superior No.1, the case goes back more than a decade and involves a group of open-heart surgeons in Indianapolis and Terre Haute who recruited a husband-wife team from Texas to provide more staff capacity at one location. All parties negotiated agreements covering multiple aspects of their business relationship, from stock purchasing to dissolution procedures and noncompete provisions. When the Texas doctors decided several years later to set up a competing practice of their own in Terre Haute, they and their former associates sued each other.

That first round of litigation went to the Court of Appeals, which in 2001 affirmed a trial judge's denial of injunctive relief for the Indiana-based physicians on grounds that an adequate remedy existed at law. But a second round of litigation ensued, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling and held that the noncompete agreements weren't enforceable. In its decision from earlier this year, the three-judge panel unanimously held that enforcing the physicians' business agreements in this case is harmful to patients and contrary to public policy. Specifically, it affirmed solely based on the public interest prong of noncompetition agreement evaluation.

Deciding on the issue during its weekly conference Dec. 17, three justices agreed with the appellate panel's decision and voted not to accept the case. But Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson disagreed with their colleagues.

The chief justice found issues with how James Blatchford and Eve Cieutat had no Indiana connections yet raised arguments that "people would die without (them) practicing in Terre Haute, that it would be very difficult to recruit doctors with their level of training to the area, and that there would be a shortage of capable doctors if they left." The two doctors have since left the state to practice elsewhere.

The chief justice wrote that the physicians group MRSD, and others in similar situations, likely wouldn't have recruited the Texas doctors or any others from outside Indiana if noncompete agreements weren't an option.

"While it is appropriate to treat employment agreements involving doctors with special care, failure to enforce at law the business agreements among doctors will mean fewer doctors available to patients, not more," he wrote, adding later that the Court of Appeals decision "muddles the caselaw of the medical business."

"This case illustrates why non-enforcement of such agreements has the potential to detract from the public interest. Denying damages to a practice seeking to enforce its business arrangements detracts from the very public interests that this Court's decisions aim to protect - patient access to medical care," Chief Justice Shepard wrote. "I think the patients (and doctors) would be well served by vacating the Court of Appeals' declaration that business arrangements between physicians are not enforceable."


Sponsored by
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. This new language about a warning has not been discussed at previous meetings. It's not available online. Since it must be made public knowledge before the vote, does anyone know exactly what it says? Further, this proposal was held up for 5 weeks because members Carol and Lucy insisted that all terms used be defined. So now, definitions are unnecessary and have not been inserted? Beyond these requirements, what is the logic behind giving one free pass to discriminators? Is that how laws work - break it once and that's ok? Just don't do it again? Three members of Carmel's council have done just about everything they can think of to prohibit an anti-discrimination ordinance in Carmel, much to Brainard's consternation, I'm told. These three 'want to be so careful' that they have failed to do what at least 13 other communities, including Martinsville, have already done. It's not being careful. It's standing in the way of what 60% of Carmel residents want. It's hurting CArmel in thT businesses have refused to locate because the council has not gotten with the program. And now they want to give discriminatory one free shot to do so. Unacceptable. Once three members leave the council because they lost their races, the Carmel council will have unanimous approval of the ordinance as originally drafted, not with a one free shot to discriminate freebie. That happens in January 2016. Why give a freebie when all we have to do is wait 3 months and get an ordinance with teeth from Day 1? If nothing else, can you please get s copy from Carmel and post it so we can see what else has changed in the proposal?

  2. Here is an interesting 2012 law review article for any who wish to dive deeper into this subject matter: Excerpt: "Judicial interpretation of the ADA has extended public entity liability to licensing agencies in the licensure and certification of attorneys.49 State bar examiners have the authority to conduct fitness investigations for the purpose of determining whether an applicant is a direct threat to the public.50 A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services as provided by § 35.139.”51 However, bar examiners may not utilize generalizations or stereotypes about the applicant’s disability in concluding that an applicant is a direct threat.52"

  3. We have been on the waiting list since 2009, i was notified almost 4 months ago that we were going to start receiving payments and we still have received nothing. Every time I call I'm told I just have to wait it's in the lawyers hands. Is everyone else still waiting?

  4. I hope you dont mind but to answer my question. What amendment does this case pretain to?

  5. Research by William J Federer Chief Justice John Marshall commented May 9, 1833, on the pamphlet The Relation of Christianity to Civil Government in the United States written by Rev. Jasper Adams, President of the College of Charleston, South Carolina (The Papers of John Marshall, ed. Charles Hobson, Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2006, p, 278): "Reverend Sir, I am much indebted to you for the copy of your valuable sermon on the relation of Christianity to civil government preached before the convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Charleston, on the 13th of February last. I have read it with great attention and advantage. The documents annexed to the sermon certainly go far in sustaining the proposition which it is your purpose to establish. One great object of the colonial charters was avowedly the propagation of the Christian faith. Means have been employed to accomplish this object, and those means have been used by government..." John Marshall continued: "No person, I believe, questions the importance of religion to the happiness of man even during his existence in this world. It has at all times employed his most serious meditation, and had a decided influence on his conduct. The American population is entirely Christian, and with us, Christianity and Religion are identified. It would be strange, indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, and did not often refer to it, and exhibit relations with it. Legislation on the subject is admitted to require great delicacy, because freedom of conscience and respect for our religion both claim our most serious regard. You have allowed their full influence to both. With very great respect, I am Sir, your Obedt., J. Marshall."