ILNews

Supreme Court upholds denial of continuance

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The majority of justices on the Indiana Supreme Court agreed that the trial court didn't abuse its discretion in denying a married couple's pro se motion to continue after their attorney withdrew six weeks before trial. The dissenting justice argued because of the complexities of the case, the trial court should have granted the couple's motion.

In Rudrappa and Jayashree Gunashekar v. Kay Grose d/b/a/ America's Affordable Housing, J&K Manufacturing, No. 02S03-0812-CV-762, the Supreme Court affirmed 4-1 the denial of the Gunashekars' motion to continue and the convictions of breach of contract, conversion, and deception. The Gunashekars hired Kay Grose's company to repair fire damage to property they leased and had insured. Grose claimed after she completed the work that Rudrappa refused to pay from his insurance proceeds, forged her name on the back of the insurance check, and wrote her a check that was returned unpaid.

The Gunashekars originally were represented by an attorney, but he withdrew six weeks prior to trial. The trial court made clear in its pretrial order that no removals or continuances of any settings or deadlines were permitted. The Gunashekars didn't obtain a new attorney and filed a pro se motion for a continuance, which the trial court denied. They appeared pro se at the trial, in which the trial court entered judgment for Grose finding the couple was jointly and severally liable for $147,000 and Rudrappa was liable for an additional $296,000 for treble damages and attorney fees.

The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the denial of motion to continue and didn't rule on any other issues.

But the Supreme Court found the trial court didn't abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the Gunashekars didn't indicate to the court they were diligent in trying to find a new attorney or whether they did anything after their original counsel withdrew, wrote Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard.

"If any inference can be drawn from the unexplained passage of six weeks from the time their attorney withdrew, it is that they were not forced to proceed without an attorney," he wrote.

Justice Robert Rucker dissented, writing that although it may be correct to say the trial court didn't abuse its discretion in denying the pro se motion, the denial is grounds for reversal. The case presented a level of complexity involving insurance proceeds, joint and several liability, contract compliance, and other issues that few, if any, pro se litigants would be able to successfully navigate, he wrote.

"With a potential exposure, and indeed an ultimate adverse judgment, of nearly a half million dollars the Gunashekars needed the assistance of trained legal counsel," Justice Rucker continued. "Fairness and equity required the trial court to afford the Gunashekars a reasonable delay to accomplish this end."

The majority also affirmed the judgment against both defendants, Rudrappa's forgery constituted conversion, Rudrappa committed conversion, and the award of attorney fees.

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

ADVERTISEMENT