ILNews

High court grants 4 transfers

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Supreme Court agreed Oct. 1 to hear four cases, including one dealing with whether a defendant should have a new murder trial and another involving whether a prior conviction in conspiracy to deal in cocaine counts as a conviction for dealing in cocaine under the state's habitual offender statute.

In Chawknee P. Caruthers v. State of Indiana, No. 46S05-0910-CR-431, the Indiana Court of Appeals split as to whether the trial court committed a fundamental error by failing to investigate the impact of threats made against the jury during a murder trial. The majority concluded the lack of questioning by the trial court of the jurors regarding the threats required the murder conviction be overturned. Judge Ezra Friedlander dissented, agreeing with the state that the harmless error doctrine should apply to defeat Chawknee Caruthers' claim of fundamental error.

In Myron Owens v. State, No. 49S02-0910-CR-429, the appellate court unanimously decided that a prior conviction of conspiracy to deal in cocaine qualified as a conviction for dealing in cocaine under the state's habitual offender statute. The Court of Appeals ruled that in order to have convicted Myron Owens of conspiracy to deal in cocaine, the state had to prove he actually dealt in cocaine, and under these particular facts and circumstances, Owens' prior conviction for conspiracy to commit dealing is, for purposes of Section 8, a prior conviction for dealing in cocaine.

In Luis E. Duran v. State of Indiana, No. 45S03-0910-CR-430, Judge Carr Darden dissented from the majority's denial of a man's motion to suppress evidence because the judge didn't believe the police officers were justified in kicking down Luis Duran's door and entering his apartment. Judges Margret Robb and L. Mark Bailey ruled the officers didn't violate Duran's Fourth Amendment rights or his rights under the Indiana Constitution because the Litchfield factors, in their totality, favored a finding the officers' conduct was reasonable.

Police incorrectly believed another man, who they were looking for on a warrant, lived at Duran's apartment. After a delay in answering his door, police kicked it down, entered Duran's apartment and found drugs.

In State of Indiana v. Robert Richardson, No. 49S02-0910-CR-428, the Court of Appeals reversed Robert Richardson's motion to suppress evidence following a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation, finding the police officer's inquiry regarding an object in his pants didn't violate Richardson's constitutional rights or the Seatbelt Enforcement Act.

Using previous caselaw regarding the Seatbelt Enforcement Act, the appellate court ruled it wasn't impermissible under the act for the officer to ask a motorist what the large object in his pants was. The inquiry didn't exceed the scope of police behavior permitted under the Seatbelt Enforcement Act; Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; or the Fourth Amendment, wrote Judge Paul Mathias.

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

ADVERTISEMENT