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High court grants 6 transfers

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The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer today to decide whether casinos can ban card counters. The high court also granted transfer to five cases Thursday, including a case of first impression regarding post-retirement health-insurance premiums.

In Thomas P. Donovan v. Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, No. 49S02-1003-CV-124, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the casino in Thomas Donovan's suit challenging his ban from the casino. The appellate court granted Donovan summary judgment on his request for declaratory judgment that the casino can't exclude him from playing blackjack because of his card counting. The Indiana Gaming Commission hasn't enacted a provision that bans card counting, and Grand Victoria can't simply take refuge in the common law right of exclusion, ruled the appellate court.

In Anne M. Bingley v. Charles B. Bingley, No. 02S03-1002-CV-122, the Court of Appeals ruled for the first time that post-retirement health-insurance premiums paid by a former employer aren't a marital asset subject to a division. The trial court didn't include Charles Bingley's employer-paid, post-retirement health-insurance premiums when dividing the couple's assets during the dissolution process.

Anne Bingley argued the payments fall under subsection 2 of Indiana Code Section 31-9-2-98(b), as a retirement benefit not forfeited upon the termination of employment, and cited several Indiana cases that found pension benefits to be marital assets. But the Court of Appeals ruled the premiums weren't a marital asset subject to division. The cases Anne cited involved monthly monetary payments made directly to the pension-holding spouse; Charles' benefit wasn't payable to him but was non-elective and couldn't be divided or transferred, wrote Judge Elaine Brown.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Terry Crone encouraged the Indiana General Assembly to address a perceived ambiguity in the definition of "retirement benefits" and "vested" in terms of the Internal Revenue Code.

In Indiana High School Athletic Association v. Jasmine S. Watson, No. 71S03-1002-CV-119, a majority on the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the Indiana High School Athletic Association acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ruled Jasmine Watson was ineligible to play basketball at a high school she transferred to just before her senior year. The majority also upheld an injunction placed by the trial court to prevent the IHSAA from enforcing the decision.

Watson's family claimed the transfer was caused by her mother's work hours being cut, the impending foreclosure of their home, and extended family living in South Bend.

Even though Watson has since graduated, the Court of Appeals took the case because if they found she was ineligible, it could force the high school to forfeit wins or awards. Even taking into account the IHSAA evidence that Watson and her mother had spoken about transferring prior to her mother's work hours being cut, the majority focused on the family's financial situation as the primary reason they moved to South Bend.

Judge Ezra Friedlander dissented because he thought the evidence supported the finding Watson was ineligible to play her senior year.

The justices granted transfer to In the Matter of the Estate of Harry L. Rickert, No. 18S04-1002-CV-118, in which one Court of Appeals judge believed In Re Estate of Banko, 622 N.E.2d 476, 480 (Ind. 1993), was binding, causing his dissent. Judge Michael Barnes disagreed with the majority that Banko doesn't apply to Rickert. He urged the high court to reconsider Banko's breadth given that an unscrupulous caregiver could take advantage of someone and get joint tenancy of accounts.

Carole Baker, as personal representative and beneficiary, argued the accounts opened by Harry Rickert's caretaker should be considered property of the estate. The trial court ruled the accounts presumptively belong to caregiver Keta Taylor unless the estate could prove "a different intention" on Rickert's part when they were created. The majority reversed and remanded for further proceedings because Rickert couldn't have had any intention regarding the ownership of the accounts at his death because he was allegedly incompetent in the last few years of his life when the accounts were made. The majority also held Banko doesn't require application of the Non-Probate Transfer Act statutory presumption in favor of Taylor as payable on death beneficiary or joint account holder under the facts of the case.

In U.S. Bank N.A. v. Integrity Land Title Corp., No. 17S03-1002-CV-120, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of U.S. Bank's motion to correct error and motion for relief from judgment in its contract claim against Integrity. There was a genuine issue of material fact whether Integrity contracted as a principal or an agent and whether Integrity breached the contract. Later on rehearing, a majority of COA judges allowed the parties to raise arguments for the first time in a response to a hearing before the appellate court. In response to U.S. Bank's petition for rehearing, Integrity raised new issues. Judge Melissa May dissented, finding the court's rules don't allow Integrity to raise the new argument and allowing it to do so effectively deprived U.S. Bank of an opportunity to respond.

In Christine Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., and Jay Komorowski, No. 45S05-1002-CV-121, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for Mittal and Jay Komorowski as to the statements described in Paragraph 6 of Dugan's complaint for defamation. Dugan was fired from Mittal following an investigation of an alleged theft ring in the department where she worked. The judges reversed summary judgment in favor of Mittal and Komorowski as to Paragraph 7 of Dugan's complaint and remanded for further proceedings on that portion of her defamation claim. Mittal failed to establish as a matter of law that the statement is protected by the common interest privilege.

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  1. Call it unauthorized law if you must, a regulatory wrong, but it was fraud and theft well beyond that, a seeming crime! "In three specific cases, the hearing officer found that Westerfield did little to no work for her clients but only issued a partial refund or no refund at all." That is theft by deception, folks. "In its decision to suspend Westerfield, the Supreme Court noted that she already had a long disciplinary history dating back to 1996 and had previously been suspended in 2004 and indefinitely suspended in 2005. She was reinstated in 2009 after finally giving the commission a response to the grievance for which she was suspended in 2004." WOW -- was the Indiana Supreme Court complicit in her fraud? Talk about being on notice of a real bad actor .... "Further, the justices noted that during her testimony, Westerfield was “disingenuous and evasive” about her relationship with Tope and attempted to distance herself from him. They also wrote that other aggravating factors existed in Westerfield’s case, such as her lack of remorse." WOW, and yet she only got 18 months on the bench, and if she shows up and cries for them in a year and a half, and pays money to JLAP for group therapy ... back in to ride roughshod over hapless clients (or are they "marks") once again! Aint Hoosier lawyering a great money making adventure!!! Just live for the bucks, even if filthy lucre, and come out a-ok. ME on the other hand??? Lifetime banishment for blowing the whistle on unconstitutional governance. Yes, had I ripped off clients or had ANY disciplinary history for doing that I would have fared better, most likely, as that it would have revealed me motivated by Mammon and not Faith. Check it out if you doubt my reading of this, compare and contrast the above 18 months with my lifetime banishment from court, see appendix for Bar Examiners report which the ISC adopted without substantive review: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS

  2. Wow, over a quarter million dollars? That is a a lot of commissary money! Over what time frame? Years I would guess. Anyone ever try to blow the whistle? Probably not, since most Hoosiers who take notice of such things realize that Hoosier whistleblowers are almost always pilloried. If someone did blow the whistle, they were likely fired. The persecution of whistleblowers is a sure sign of far too much government corruption. Details of my own personal experience at the top of Hoosier governance available upon request ... maybe a "fake news" media outlet will have the courage to tell the stories of Hoosier whistleblowers that the "real" Hoosier media (cough) will not deign to touch. (They are part of the problem.)

  3. So if I am reading it right, only if and when African American college students agree to receive checks labeling them as "Negroes" do they receive aid from the UNCF or the Quaker's Educational Fund? In other words, to borrow from the Indiana Appellate Court, "the [nonprofit] supposed to be [their] advocate, refers to [students] in a racially offensive manner. While there is no evidence that [the nonprofits] intended harm to [African American students], the harm was nonetheless inflicted. [Black students are] presented to [academia and future employers] in a racially offensive manner. For these reasons, [such] performance [is] deficient and also prejudice[ial]." Maybe even DEPLORABLE???

  4. I'm the poor soul who spent over 10 years in prison with many many other prisoners trying to kill me for being charged with a sex offense THAT I DID NOT COMMIT i was in jail for a battery charge for helping a friend leave a boyfriend who beat her I've been saying for over 28 years that i did not and would never hurt a child like that mine or anybody's child but NOBODY wants to believe that i might not be guilty of this horrible crime or think that when i say that ALL the paperwork concerning my conviction has strangely DISAPPEARED or even when the long beach judge re-sentenced me over 14 months on a already filed plea bargain out of another districts court then had it filed under a fake name so i could not find while trying to fight my conviction on appeal in a nut shell people are ALWAYS quick to believe the worst about some one well I DID NOT HURT ANY CHILD EVER IN MY LIFE AND HAVE SAID THIS FOR ALMOST 30 YEARS please if anybody can me get some kind of justice it would be greatly appreciated respectfully written wrongly accused Brian Valenti

  5. A high ranking Indiana supreme Court operative caught red handed leading a group using the uber offensive N word! She must denounce or be denounced! (Or not since she is an insider ... rules do not apply to them). Evidence here: http://m.indianacompanies.us/friends-educational-fund-for-negroes.364110.company.v2#top_info

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