ILNews

Legal malpractice claims not assignable

Jennifer Nelson
January 1, 2007
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In an Indiana Supreme Court ruling, the majority of justices held that legal malpractice claims are not assignable and courts cannot require a person to assign his or her chose in action.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ruth Estep, Personal Representative of the Estate of Ewing Dan Estep, and Assignee of Rights of James D. Perkins, the high court yesterday reversed the trial court's order during proceedings supplemental forcing James Perkins' assignment of any potential chose in action against State Farm and held invalid any assignment by Perkins against his attorneys.

James Perkins had been ordered by the trial court to assign any cause of action he may have against his insurer, State Farm, to Ruth Estep, the personal representative of the estate of Ewing Dan Estep, who died as a result of injuries suffered from a motorcycle crash caused by Perkins. The estate was trying to recover $615,000 still owed from a judgment against Perkins in a personal injury action initiated before Estep's death.

In the original suit, Perkins retained his personal attorney, Jerry Susong, as co-counsel to Michael Stephenson, who was retained by State Farm. In March 2002, the jury awarded Estep's estate $675,000. The day after the verdict, State Farm paid Perkins' full policy limit of $50,000 to the estate, and the estate initiated proceedings supplemental a month later pursuant to Trial Rule 69(E) against Perkins for the unpaid amount.

Stephenson withdrew that July, concluding he completed his defense obligations under Perkins' insurance policy. Susong continued to represent Perkins. After Stephenson withdrew, the estate sought an order to have Perkins assign to it any cause of action Perkins may have against State Farm. Perkins refused and denied there was basis for any bad faith claims, but the court ordered him to assign to the estate any potential bad faith claims he may have against State Farm.

Perkins assigned to the estate all potential claims, demands, and causes of actions arising from the estate's personal injury claim against him. As a result, the estate sued State Farm in an Illinois court for the uncollected $615,000, alleging State Farm breached its duty of good faith owed to Perkins by not providing a conflict-free defense because Stephenson tried to withdraw his representation of Perkins but was denied. The estate also sued Susong, claming he should have told Perkins that Stephenson had a conflict of interest.

State Farm moved to intervene in the Indiana proceedings supplemental and asked the order compelling Perkins' assignment be vacated. The trial court denied both motions.

The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, concluded just as the court held under Picadilly Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. 1991), that legal malpractice claims are not assignable. Perkins could file a suit against Susong directly, but he cannot assign this to a third party because such assignments would be harmful to the lawyer-client relationship.

The majority also found the trial court ordering Perkins' forced assignment of his chose in action against State Farm was an error. Perkins can directly sue State Farm or voluntarily assign his chose in action, but he cannot be forced to assign it. Indiana follows the Direct Action Rule that prohibits a third party or judgment creditor from directly suing a judgment debtor's insurance carrier to recover an excess judgment.

In a separate opinion, Justices Ted Boehm and Brent Dickson dissented, noting State Farm should have been allowed to intervene in the proceedings supplemental and that the trial court erred in ordering assignment of Perkins' claims against State Farm.

Justice Boehm wrote that State Farm did not show a cognizable interest under Trial Rule 24(A) to intervene in the proceedings supplemental and does not satisfy all of the requirements under the rule.

Also in his dissent, Justice Boehm wrote that proceedings supplemental courts have a power to compel a judgment debtor to assign the debtor's potential causes of actions against third parties, just as other assets may be compelled to be transferred, so the assignment by the proceedings supplemental court was appropriate even though it was over Perkins' objection. 
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  1. From back in the day before secularism got a stranglehold on Hoosier jurists comes this great excerpt via Indiana federal court judge Allan Sharp, dedicated to those many Indiana government attorneys (with whom I have dealt) who count the law as a mere tool, an optional tool that is not to be used when political correctness compels a more acceptable result than merely following the path that the law directs: ALLEN SHARP, District Judge. I. In a scene following a visit by Henry VIII to the home of Sir Thomas More, playwriter Robert Bolt puts the following words into the mouths of his characters: Margaret: Father, that man's bad. MORE: There is no law against that. ROPER: There is! God's law! MORE: Then God can arrest him. ROPER: Sophistication upon sophistication! MORE: No, sheer simplicity. The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal. ROPER: Then you set man's law above God's! MORE: No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of law, oh, there I'm a forester. I doubt if there's a man alive who could follow me there, thank God... ALICE: (Exasperated, pointing after Rich) While you talk, he's gone! MORE: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law! ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law! MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! MORE: (Roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on Roper) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat? (He leaves *1257 him) This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast man's laws, not God's and if you cut them down and you're just the man to do it d'you really think you would stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. ROPER: I have long suspected this; this is the golden calf; the law's your god. MORE: (Wearily) Oh, Roper, you're a fool, God's my god... (Rather bitterly) But I find him rather too (Very bitterly) subtle... I don't know where he is nor what he wants. ROPER: My God wants service, to the end and unremitting; nothing else! MORE: (Dryly) Are you sure that's God! He sounds like Moloch. But indeed it may be God And whoever hunts for me, Roper, God or Devil, will find me hiding in the thickets of the law! And I'll hide my daughter with me! Not hoist her up the mainmast of your seagoing principles! They put about too nimbly! (Exit More. They all look after him). Pgs. 65-67, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS A Play in Two Acts, Robert Bolt, Random House, New York, 1960. Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Indianapolis, for defendants. Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1981) aff'd, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)

  2. "Meanwhile small- and mid-size firms are getting squeezed and likely will not survive unless they become a boutique firm." I've been a business attorney in small, and now mid-size firm for over 30 years, and for over 30 years legal consultants have been preaching this exact same mantra of impending doom for small and mid-sized firms -- verbatim. This claim apparently helps them gin up merger opportunities from smaller firms who become convinced that they need to become larger overnight. The claim that large corporations are interested in cost-saving and efficiency has likewise been preached for decades, and is likewise bunk. If large corporations had any real interest in saving money they wouldn't use large law firms whose rates are substantially higher than those of high-quality mid-sized firms.

  3. The family is the foundation of all human government. That is the Grand Design. Modern governments throw off this Design and make bureaucratic war against the family, as does Hollywood and cultural elitists such as third wave feminists. Since WWII we have been on a ship of fools that way, with both the elite and government and their social engineering hacks relentlessly attacking the very foundation of social order. And their success? See it in the streets of Fergusson, on the food stamp doles (mostly broken families)and in the above article. Reject the Grand Design for true social function, enter the Glorious State to manage social dysfunction. Our Brave New World will be a prison camp, and we will welcome it as the only way to manage given the anarchy without it.

  4. When I hear 'Juvenile Lawyer' I think of an attorney helping a high school aged kid through the court system for a poor decision; like smashing mailboxes. Thank you for opening up my eyes to the bigger picture of the need for juvenile attorneys. It made me sad, but also fascinated, when it was explained, in the sixth paragraph, that parents making poor decisions (such as drug abuse) can cause situations where children need legal representation and aid from a lawyer.

  5. Some in the Hoosier legal elite consider this prayer recommended by the AG seditious, not to mention the Saint who pledged loyalty to God over King and went to the axe for so doing: "Thomas More, counselor of law and statesman of integrity, merry martyr and most human of saints: Pray that, for the glory of God and in the pursuit of His justice, I may be trustworthy with confidences, keen in study, accurate in analysis, correct in conclusion, able in argument, loyal to clients, honest with all, courteous to adversaries, ever attentive to conscience. Sit with me at my desk and listen with me to my clients' tales. Read with me in my library and stand always beside me so that today I shall not, to win a point, lose my soul. Pray that my family may find in me what yours found in you: friendship and courage, cheerfulness and charity, diligence in duties, counsel in adversity, patience in pain—their good servant, and God's first. Amen."

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