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Justices rule on convictions, sentencing in police-impersonation case

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2007
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Various offenses committed at different times and in different counties do not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct for sentencing purposes, the Indiana Supreme Court has reinforced this week.

That logic, however, doesn't extend to convictions, as the state's highest court has affirmed a lower appellate finding that multiple instances of police officer impersonation are considered "the same occurrence," and subsequent convictions in different counties violate Indiana's double jeopardy statute.

Justices granted transfer Wednesday in Derek Scott Geiger v. State of Indiana, issuing a two-page order that summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' May 23 decision in Geiger v. State, 866 N.E. 2d 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

This case arises from an incident in July 2005 when Geiger and three others pulled a couple over and claimed to be narcotics officers. Geiger pleaded guilty in July 2006 to felony armed robbery in Floyd County and was sentenced to 10 years. In Harrison County, a jury found him guilty that August and he was later sentenced to 12 years to run consecutively to his Floyd County sentence. Charges were still pending at the time in Clark County for a similar incident.

In the lower appellate decision in May, the court vacated Geiger's conviction in Harrison County for impersonating a public servant because of his previous conviction for the same in Floyd County. The court held that "a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of impersonating a public servant pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-44-2-3 based on the same occurrence, even if there are multiple victims."

The court noted, "It is an issue of first impression whether the appropriate number of convictions for impersonating a public servant turns on the number of victims to whom the defendant misrepresents or, instead, on the number of occasions on which the defendant engages in the unlawful conduct."

An appellate panel consisting of Chief Judge John Baker and Judges Mark Bailey and Melissa May determined that IC 35-44-2-3 is a conduct-oriented statute focusing on the act of impersonating a public servant and the intent to mislead another person. The statute doesn't require the victim to actually believe or be induced by the misrepresentation, the court reasoned.

In its order, the Supreme Court didn't delve into the conviction component of the case, affirming the Court of Appeals and only delving into the sentencing issues.

When analyzing the sentencing components on appeal, the Court of Appeals judges used a balancing test and determined "the independent nature of each of these offenses leads us to conclude that they are not a single episode of criminal conduct." The court rejected Geiger's argument that the consecutive sentences exceeded the length allowed by IC 35-50-1-2, in part because the offenses in both counties constituted one episode of that conduct.

Justices agreed, citing Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1201 (Ind. 2006), and Harris v. State, 861 N.E. 2d 1182, 1188 (Ind. 2007), that both addressed the "episode of criminal conduct" issue.

The balancing test cited from Reed says, "Although the ability to recount each charge without referring to the other can provide additional guidance on the question of whether a defendant's conduct constitutes an episode of criminal conduct, it is not a critical ingredient in resolving the question. Rather, the statute speaks in less absolute terms: 'a connected series of offenses that are closely connected in time, place, and circumstance.'"

Justices wrote they agreed with the appellate court's conclusion that the various offenses, committed at different times and in different counties, did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct.

The Supreme Court addressed another point Geiger made about how proper consecutive sentences were in that he didn't receive advisory sentences on the individual convictions. But the court dismissed that claim by citing a decision from Aug. 8 in Robertson v. State, where the holding was that a court imposing a consecutive sentence is not limited to the advisory sentence.
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  1. Actually, and most strikingly, the ruling failed to address the central issue to the whole case: Namely, Black Knight/LPS, who was NEVER a party to the State court litigation, and who is under a 2013 consent judgment in Indiana (where it has stipulated to the forgery of loan documents, the ones specifically at issue in my case)never disclosed itself in State court or remediated the forged loan documents as was REQUIRED of them by the CJ. In essence, what the court is willfully ignoring, is that it is setting a precedent that the supplier of a defective product, one whom is under a consent judgment stipulating to such, and under obligation to remediate said defective product, can: 1.) Ignore the CJ 2.) Allow counsel to commit fraud on the state court 3.) Then try to hide behind Rooker Feldman doctrine as a bar to being held culpable in federal court. The problem here is the court is in direct conflict with its own ruling(s) in Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings & Iqbal- 780 F.3d 728, at 730 “What Johnson adds - what the defendants in this suit have failed to appreciate—is that federal courts retain jurisdiction to award damages for fraud that imposes extrajudicial injury. The Supreme Court drew that very line in Exxon Mobil ... Iqbal alleges that the defendants conducted a racketeering enterprise that predates the state court’s judgments ...but Exxon Mobil shows that the Rooker Feldman doctrine asks what injury the plaintiff asks the federal court to redress, not whether the injury is “intertwined” with something else …Because Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predates the state litigation and caused injury independently of it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not block this suit. It must be reinstated.” So, as I already noted to others, I now have the chance to bring my case to SCOTUS; the ruling by Wood & Posner is flawed on numerous levels,BUT most troubling is the fact that the authors KNOW it's a flawed ruling and choose to ignore the flaws for one simple reason: The courts have decided to agree with former AG Eric Holder that national banks "Are too big to fail" and must win at any cost-even that of due process, case precedent, & the truth....Let's see if SCOTUS wants a bite at the apple.

  2. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

  3. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

  4. Please I need help with my class action lawsuits, im currently in pro-se and im having hard time findiNG A LAWYER TO ASSIST ME

  5. Access to the court (judiciary branch of government) is the REAL problem, NOT necessarily lack of access to an attorney. Unfortunately, I've lived in a legal and financial hell for the past six years due to a divorce (where I was, supposedly, represented by an attorney) in which I was defrauded of settlement and the other party (and helpers) enriched through the fraud. When I attempted to introduce evidence and testify (pro se) in a foreclosure/eviction, I was silenced (apparently on procedural grounds, as research I've done since indicates). I was thrown out of a residence which was to be sold, by a judge who refused to allow me to speak in (the supposedly "informal") small claims court where the eviction proceeding (by ex-brother-in-law) was held. Six years and I can't even get back on solid or stable ground ... having bank account seized twice, unlawfully ... and now, for the past year, being dragged into court - again, contrary to law and appellate decisions - by former attorney, who is trying to force payment from exempt funds. Friday will mark fifth appearance. Hopefully, I'll be allowed to speak. The situation I find myself in shouldn't even be possible, much less dragging out with no end in sight, for years. I've done nothing wrong, but am watching a lot of wrong being accomplished under court jurisdiction; only because I was married to someone who wanted and was granted a divorce (but was not willing to assume the responsibilities that come with granting the divorce). In fact, the recalcitrant party was enriched by well over $100k, although it was necessarily split with other actors. Pro bono help? It's a nice dream ... but that's all it is, for too many. Meanwhile, injustice marches on.

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