ILNews

Justices hear IMPD arresting-authority case

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2007
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Indiana's highest jurists today questioned attorneys about whether any arresting authority exists for those who didn't take an official oath for the recently created Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department.

Justices' pointed questions go to the heart of State v. Cheryl Oddi-Smith, 49A05-0708-CR-445, a drunk driving case that Marion Superior Judge Rueben Hill ruled on in early August, throwing out a woman's arrest because of the oath-taking issue. The Indiana Attorney General's office filed a petition in August to appeal the case directly to the state's highest court. Justices accepted emergency transfer Oct. 9 to bypass the Court of Appeals, citing Appellate Rule 56(A) that notes in rare cases the court can bypass the lower court "upon a showing that the appeal involves a substantial question of law of great public importance and that an emergency exists requiring a speedy determination."

This high-profile appeal comes after Judge Hill in Criminal Court 18 - himself a former Indiana State Police trooper - decided that the January drunk-driving arrest of Oddi-Smith was illegal because the arresting officer was not officially sworn in after the police merger of the Indianapolis Police Department and the Marion County Sheriff's Department. Only top officials and a few officers took the oath following the merger, according to defense attorneys James Voyles and Annie Fierek.

The judge noted in his opinion that the main legal issue is whether this merger created an entirely new police agency, and if so then all officers would need to be sworn in again.

Potentially at stake in the case: thousands of arrests made this year. Though Judge Hill has vowed not to hold this standard to other cases, and the officers have since taken an official oath, defense attorneys could still have a field day with appeals on countless arrests made by the law enforcement agency.

Cynthia Ploughe, deputy attorney general arguing for the Indiana Attorney General's Office, told the court that oaths are mostly ceremonial and don't mean much - it's the training that matters more.

"There is no state law that requires the IMDP to be sworn in; they are de facto officers," she said, mentioning that the local in-house ordinance can't be applied as a law.

Justice Brent Dickson interjected arguments at one point, asking the importance of this issue that seems more like a "fictional issue" than anything of practical importance. He posed the question of whether an officer is less obligated to the Constitution by not taking an oath.

Voyles countered the state's point, noting that an oath is more than just a "technical nicety" and is a promise that officers will uphold the Constitution.

Justice Frank Sullivan picked up on the term "consolidated" and compared the law enforcement consolidation to a corporate merger, where the new entity is beholden to all the previous liability and obligations the former two agencies had.

He pondered what would happen to lawsuits or actions filed to a previous agency if that liability went away with a consolidation, and his colleagues picked up on that thought. Justice Ted Boehm noted that it could create an opportunity for municipalities to create a shell game to avoid liability, washing their hands clean of any potential trouble by forming a new entity.

"If an oath doesn't carry over, what else doesn't carry over," Justice Sullivan asked. "What implications does that have, and how can that make sense?"

You can watch the Supreme Court arguments online at http://www.indianacourts.org/apps/webcasts.
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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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