ILNews

Court vacates summary judgment

Jennifer Nelson
January 1, 2007
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The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated an Indiana District Court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case so the court could determine what right a company has to receive compensation for its vandalized railroad cars.

In CSX Transportation Inc. v. Appalachian Railcar Services Inc., No. 06-3430, CSX brought suit in the Southern District to recover payment it made to Appalachian Railcar Services (ARS) for damaged railcars. CSX believed the 13 railcars derailed on CSX-owned track, making them liable for any damages; CSX paid ARS to replace 12 of the cars and repair one. Later, CSX reviewed the payments it made to ARS and determined the derailment didn't occur on track they owned. The owner of the track still has not been determined.

CSX filed a lawsuit to recover the money it paid to ARS, contending the payments constituted unjust enrichment because they were made on the basis of a mistake of fact. The District Court granted ARS' motion for summary judgment based on the voluntary-payment doctrine.

In Indiana, the voluntary-payment doctrine states that "money voluntarily paid in the face of a recognized uncertainty as to the existence or extent of the payor's obligation to the recipient may not be recovered, on the ground of 'mistake,' merely because the payment is subsequently revealed to have exceeded the true amount of the underlying obligation."

The District Court held that the voluntary-payment doctrine barred recovery by CSX because it paid ARS in the face of a recognized uncertainty, the amount of liability owed. The court reasoned a certainty of liability would have allowed CSX to simply send ARS a check for the amount of damages, rather than asking ARS about the value of the damaged cars.

Judge Ilana Rovner wrote that because neither CSX nor ARS regarded CSX's responsibility for the derailment as uncertain, whether the payment embodied the possibility that CSX did not own the track is a fact question that precludes summary judgment on the basis of the voluntary-payment doctrine. The District Court focused on the doctrine and did not consider other arguments raised by either party. The 7th Circuit cannot determine if ARS was actually entitled to the payment by CSX or another party, nor can it determine whether ARS's reasonable reliance on CSX caused ARS to forego the opportunity to investigate the accident or discover for itself if it was entitled to payment.
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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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