ILNews

Court examines 'judge' definition

Jennifer Nelson
January 1, 2007
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The Indiana Appeals Court today upheld the convictions and sentence of man who sent threatening letters to the Marion County Prosecutors Office, a judge, and commissioner after being ordered to have no contact.

To be clear in its decision, the appellate court delved into the definition of "judge" and determined the term does include a county commissioner who handles legal matters for the court.

In Allen Montgomery v. State of Indiana, No. 49A04-0703-CR-188, Montgomery appealed his two Class D felony convictions for intimidation and 11 Class A misdemeanor convictions for invasion of privacy. Montgomery was convicted of impersonating a public servant and was placed on probation. As a part of the probation, he was ordered to not have any contact with the Marion County Prosecutor's Office unless it was to report a crime.

A week after he was placed on probation, Montgomery went before Master Commissioner Nancy Broyles regarding an alleged probation violation on a separate incident. Marion Superior Judge Grant Hawkins appointed Commissioner Broyles and assigned her duties, including hearing jury trials.

Commissioner Broyles revoked Montgomery's probation and ordered him to serve four years in the Indiana Department of Correction. From there, Montgomery sent letters to the prosecutor's office, none of which reported crimes. He also sent a letter to Commissioner Broyles saying he found her home address online and he hated to see something happen to her. Montgomery sent a letter to Judge Hawkins, telling him protecting Commissioner Broyles would be "an exercise in futility."

Montgomery was convicted of intimidation and invasion of privacy; he was also deemed a habitual offender. His intimidation charges were amended to Class D felonies because of his threats to a judge. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 7 1/2 years, which included an enhancement of 4 1/2 years for being a habitual offender.

On appeal, Montgomery argued his Class D conviction for threatening a judge was in error because Commissioner Broyles is not a judge as is defined by the code that defines intimidation.

But the court disagreed, with Judge Nancy Vaidik writing that Commissioner Broyles was appointed by a Superior Court judge to hear and decide legal matters in the court - how a judge is defined in Black's Law Dictionary. Therefore, sufficient evidence exists to support the Class D felony convictions, she wrote.

Montgomery believed his convictions for invasion of privacy also violated his state and federal constitutional rights, but Montgomery never raised on appeal the issue that the no-contact order with the prosecutor's office put a restraint on his "politically expressive speech." The appellate court did not address this issue because Montgomery didn't attempt to appeal that issue at the time it was imposed.

As far as Montgomery's sentence, the appellate court found the trial court was well within statutory rights to enhance his sentence for being a habitual offender, and given the nature of his offenses and his character, his sentence was appropriate.
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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

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  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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