ILNews

Circuit Court rules against deputy town marshal

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2007
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A Fort Wayne couple will get their day in court after the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals determined the Orland deputy town marshal violated the couple's constitutional rights during an altercation at a towing lot three years ago.

In Ryan L. Belcher and Daraina Gleason v. Vaughn Norton and Town of Orland, the court ruled 2-1 Wednesday that the case shouldn't have been dismissed by U.S. District Judge Theresa Springmann in Fort Wayne. The district judge had ruled that Norton, the town's deputy marshal at the time, did not unreasonably hold the couple against their will; however, the Circuit Court disagreed.

Belcher and Gleason were traveling on the Indiana Toll Road in February 2004 when the transmission broke in their minivan. When a state trooper stopped to help, he ended up arresting Belcher for driving without a license and had the van towed to Bill's Professional Towing in Orland. Belcher and Gleason went to the yard a few days later to remove personal items from the van, including medicine and court papers, but when they removed more the lot owner insisted they couldn't leave without paying impoundment fees or signing ownership of the van over to the yard. Police were called and Norton arrived; he also wouldn't let the two leave until they abided by one of the two options. Eventually, they signed ownership over to the tow yard.

The couple sued in 2005, but Judge Springmann granted summary judgment to the town and Norton. This 7th Circuit ruling agreed that the town could not be held liable, but the court reversed on grounds that Norton acted inappropriately and could be sued for unreasonable search and seizure because his actions "shock the conscience."

"Because we conclude that Deputy Marshal Norton is entitled to the broad statutory immunity afforded by ITCA, we also must conclude that the statute does not provide an adequate state law remedy to the plaintiffs," the court wrote. "The plaintiffs may recover their costs from Deputy Marshal Norton."

Circuit Judge Daniel A. Manion disagreed in his dissent, noting that: "While the record could, and very well may, indicate that Norton acted improperly, nothing in the record evinces that his behavior was abhorrent," he wrote. "The whole process was unfortunately clumsy and mishandled, but by no means shocking to the conscience."
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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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