ILNews

COA differs on when 'critical stage' starts

Jennifer Nelson
January 1, 2008
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A panel of Indiana Court of Appeals judges agreed that a defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a polygraph test should have been granted by the trial court. But the judges had differing reasons for granting the reversal of the trial court, with the majority deviating from precedent on when the right to counsel begins.

In Thomas E. Caraway v. State of Indiana, No. 47A01-0709-CR-416, Thomas Caraway appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and exclude all evidence of a polygraph examination. Caraway, who had difficulty reading, was read the stipulation agreement by a detective, who didn't mention a Miranda warning or notify Caraway of his right to counsel regarding the polygraph examination. It wasn't until an Indiana State trooper read Caraway his Miranda warnings from a form - including the right to seek the assistance of counsel - right before Caraway was to take the test that he was made aware of that right.

The judges looked to previous caselaw and the federal and Indiana Constitutions to determine whether Caraway's motion should have been granted by the trial court. In Kochersperger v. State, 725 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), Kochersperger signed an agreement to undergo a polygraph examination after he was read his Miranda warning and was advised of his right to counsel. He later raised a motion to suppress the results of the polygraph test, which the trial court denied.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial because Kochersperger was fully advised of his right to counsel and waived that right. That panel also stated the filing of an indictment or information begins the formal criminal process, and because Kochersperger hadn't been arrested, arraigned or indicted during the polygraph test, those periods didn't constitute critical stages of criminal proceedings that required a right to counsel.

However, in the instant case, the majority disagreed with the Kochersperger court and other Indiana caselaw, and ruled the right to counsel can attach earlier than the initiation of criminal proceedings.

"In this case, the application of Kochersperger would derogate from the protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution," wrote Judge Patricia Riley for the majority. "... Although Caraway was not arrested, arraigned, or indicted at the time he stipulated to the polygraph, he waived any objection to the admission of an unreliable form of potentially incriminating evidence. This can be nothing less than a critical stage."

When a defendant finds him or herself in a critical stage, their right to counsel can't be denied simply because they haven't been formally indicted yet, she continued. As a result, the absence of Caraway's right to an attorney derogated his right to a fair trial and because he was never informed of his right to counsel before stipulating to the results of the polygraph test, he couldn't have waived it.

Judge Margret Robb concurred in result in a separate opinion but disagreed as to why the trial court should have granted Caraway's motion to suppress. As a concurring judge in Kochersperger, Judge Robb wrote she continues to believe the right of counsel doesn't attach until criminal proceedings are initiated by the filing of an information or indictment.

"The timing of the advice of rights is an important distinction between Kochersperger and this case," she wrote. "On the basis that Caraway was not advised of and did not waive his right to counsel before signing the stipulation, rather than on the basis of the Sixth Amendment, I agree that the trial court should have granted Caraway's motion to suppress, and I therefore concur in result."
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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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