ILNews

State must arbitrate with tobacco companies

Jennifer Nelson
January 1, 2008
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States involved in a settlement agreement with certain tobacco companies to recover health care costs for smoking-related illnesses must participate in a single, national arbitration panel when arbitrating issues, ruled the Indiana Court of Appeals today.

In State of Indiana, ex rel., Stephen R. Carter, Attorney General of Indiana v. Philip Morris Tobacco Company, et al., No. 49A02-0706-CV-494, the state appealed the trial court order requiring Indiana to arbitrate with Philip Morris and other tobacco companies the decision of the independent auditor to not apply a particular adjustment for 2003 regarding a master settlement agreement.

In the late 1990s, certain states - including Indiana - created a master settlement agreement (MSA) with certain tobacco companies in order for the states to receive health care costs for smoking-related illnesses developed by the states' residents. Other tobacco companies later became parties to the agreement. All of the participating manufacturers (PMs) were required to make substantial annual payments based upon certain data and calculations set forth in the MSA.

An independent auditor is required to calculate the amount of all payments owed under the MSA and also determines any applicable adjustments or reductions.

In 2003, the independent auditor did not apply a non-participating manufacturers (NPM) adjustment to the PMs' payments. The NPM adjustment potentially reduces the annual payment of the PMs in compensation for their market share loss to NPMs.

The settling states agreed with the auditor's final calculations for 2003, but the PMs moved the trial court to compel arbitration of the matter. The trial court held a hearing and determined the matter should be arbitrated per the MSA. The state filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied.

Indiana appealed, arguing the trial court erred when it ordered the state to participate in arbitration pursuant to the MSA; also, the state believed the trial court erred when it ordered arbitration by a single, national arbitration panel.

The arbitration clause in the MSA states any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to calculations made by the independent auditor shall be submitted to binding arbitration before a panel of three, neutral arbitrators. The state argued that this issue is not arbitrational because the state had enforced a qualifying statute, which allowed for the denial of the NPM adjustment, and the enforcement of the qualifying statute is not arbitrational.

Senior Judge George Hoffman Jr. wrote in the opinion that under the MSA, the NPM adjustment is an arbitration issue because the NPM adjustment is a calculation determined by the independent auditor. The dispute between the settling states and the tobacco companies arose out of the auditor's calculation, which must be arbitrated per the MSA. In fact, the independent auditor is charged with making the determination of the state's diligent enforcement of its qualifying statute because it is a part of the NPM adjustment determination.

In regards to the state claim that the trial court erred in ordering it to arbitrate the issue by a single, national panel instead of a panel of three, neutral arbitrators, the state cited the arbitration clause in the MSA that stated each of the two sides of the dispute select an arbitrator, and those two arbitrators then pick the third one.

Senior Judge Hoffman wrote the language and the structure of the MSA require that the dispute must be submitted to a single, national arbitration panel, expressly providing "each of the two sides to the dispute shall select one arbitrator." The two sides in the dispute are the settling states - not just Indiana - and the PMs.

"If the parties had meant for each Settling State to have its own arbitrator or arbitration panel, this sub-section of the MSA would not have specified a panel of only three arbitrators, which clearly indicates a national arbitration," he wrote.

Also, the MSA is an agreement of nationwide concern with national effect and structure. The language as well as the structure of the MSA requires disputes such as this to be determined by a single, national arbitration panel, Senior Judge Hoffman wrote.
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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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