ILNews

High court: 'Contact' must be clearly defined

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2008
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The Indiana Supreme Court has determined what kind of "contact" a convicted child molester can have without violating probation.

In the court's 4-1 decision April 2 in Theron W. Hunter v. State of Indiana, No. 69S01-0708-CR-332, the justices reversed Ripley Circuit Judge Carl Taul's 2006 ruling to revoke Hunter's probation. The case is remanded with instruction to reinstate the probation.

Hunter was convicted in 2000 of felony child molesting and sentenced to eight years, with four years suspended. He was released in July 2006 and placed on probation, but three months later the county probation department sought to revoke that probation. The trial court determined he'd violated his probation by living on his father's property 15 feet from his half-sister's mobile home where three children ages 14 to 18 lived, and that he had been in that mobile home remodeling the bathroom at times when the children came home from school. Hunter testified that he'd pack up and leave as quickly as possible about the time school left out, but sometimes he wasn't able to leave before they got home.

At issue was a probation condition that he "must never be alone with or have contact with any person under the age 18 ... Contact includes face-to-face, telephonic, written, electronic, or any indirect contact via third parties." Any "incidental contact" also had to be reported within 24 hours to his probation officer.

While Hunter contended that "contact" meant some type of "interaction," the state construed the word more broadly and argued it meant merely being in the presence of anyone under 18 and that was sufficient to prove a probation violation. The Court of Appeals agreed in a memorandum ruling in June.

But a majority of the state justices disagreed, indicating the wording of the probation condition was "ambiguous" and isn't enough to have revoked Hunter's probation.

In writing for the majority, Justice Brent Dickson noted that Hunter had cited a decade-old appellate ruling of Wright v. State, 688 N.E.2d 224, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) that quoted Webster's Dictionary in noting "contact" means "establishing of communication with someone" or "to get into communication with," as well as "communication occurs when a person makes something known or transmits information to another." Justice Dickson also observed that the word "is not commonly understood to occur by mere presence alone."

"If the trial court intended a condition of probation to prohibit the defendant from the behavior shown by the evidence in this case, effective deterrence and fair advance notice necessitate that the choice of language must clearly describe the prohibited contact," Justice Dickson wrote. "The probation condition in this case lacked sufficient clarity to provide the defendant with fair notice that the conduct at issue would constitute a violation of probation."

He also wrote that the occasional "incidental contact" with his sister's children didn't constitute a violation because the vagary of the word in this case.

Justice Frank Sullivan disagreed with his colleagues, writing in a dissent that the probation conditions clearly defined what the word "contact" meant, that it didn't require "interaction," and the term "face-to-face" was not vague.

"There is no dispute but that Hunter was present on multiple occasions in the mobile home when the children came home from school," he wrote. "This was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that Hunter had face-to-face contact with children under the age of 18. He did not report the contact to his probation officer within 24 hours of the contact. This was sufficient to support the revocation of his probation."
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  1. He TIL team,please zap this comment too since it was merely marking a scammer and not reflecting on the story. Thanks, happy Monday, keep up the fine work.

  2. You just need my social security number sent to your Gmail account to process then loan, right? Beware scammers indeed.

  3. The appellate court just said doctors can be sued for reporting child abuse. The most dangerous form of child abuse with the highest mortality rate of any form of child abuse (between 6% and 9% according to the below listed studies). Now doctors will be far less likely to report this form of dangerous child abuse in Indiana. If you want to know what this is, google the names Lacey Spears, Julie Conley (and look at what happened when uninformed judges returned that child against medical advice), Hope Ybarra, and Dixie Blanchard. Here is some really good reporting on what this allegation was: http://media.star-telegram.com/Munchausenmoms/ Here are the two research papers: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0145213487900810 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0145213403000309 25% of sibling are dead in that second study. 25%!!! Unbelievable ruling. Chilling. Wrong.

  4. Mr. Levin says that the BMV engaged in misconduct--that the BMV (or, rather, someone in the BMV) knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged fees but did nothing to correct the situation. Such misconduct, whether engaged in by one individual or by a group, is called theft (defined as knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control over the property of another person with the intent to deprive the other person of the property's value or use). Theft is a crime in Indiana (as it still is in most of the civilized world). One wonders, then, why there have been no criminal prosecutions of BMV officials for this theft? Government misconduct doesn't occur in a vacuum. An individual who works for or oversees a government agency is responsible for the misconduct. In this instance, somebody (or somebodies) with the BMV, at some time, knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged. What's more, this person (or these people), even after having the error of their ways pointed out to them, did nothing to fix the problem. Instead, the overcharges continued. Thus, the taxpayers of Indiana are also on the hook for the millions of dollars in attorneys fees (for both sides; the BMV didn't see fit to avail itself of the services of a lawyer employed by the state government) that had to be spent in order to finally convince the BMV that stealing money from Indiana motorists was a bad thing. Given that the BMV official(s) responsible for this crime continued their misconduct, covered it up, and never did anything until the agency reached an agreeable settlement, it seems the statute of limitations for prosecuting these folks has not yet run. I hope our Attorney General is paying attention to this fiasco and is seriously considering prosecution. Indiana, the state that works . . . for thieves.

  5. I'm glad that attorney Carl Hayes, who represented the BMV in this case, is able to say that his client "is pleased to have resolved the issue". Everyone makes mistakes, even bureaucratic behemoths like Indiana's BMV. So to some extent we need to be forgiving of such mistakes. But when those mistakes are going to cost Indiana taxpayers millions of dollars to rectify (because neither plaintiff's counsel nor Mr. Hayes gave freely of their services, and the BMV, being a state-funded agency, relies on taxpayer dollars to pay these attorneys their fees), the agency doesn't have a right to feel "pleased to have resolved the issue". One is left wondering why the BMV feels so pleased with this resolution? The magnitude of the agency's overcharges might suggest to some that, perhaps, these errors were more than mere oversight. Could this be why the agency is so "pleased" with this resolution? Will Indiana motorists ever be assured that the culture of incompetence (if not worse) that the BMV seems to have fostered is no longer the status quo? Or will even more "overcharges" and lawsuits result? It's fairly obvious who is really "pleased to have resolved the issue", and it's not Indiana's taxpayers who are on the hook for the legal fees generated in these cases.

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