ILNews

High court affirms summary judgment for bank

Jennifer Nelson
January 1, 2008
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A bank that opened an account for a man who used it to fraudulently deposit checks wasn't required under Indiana Code to exercise ordinary care when opening the account, ruled the Indiana Supreme Court.

At issue in Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Bank One, et al., No. 49S04-0701-CV-27 is whether Bank One violated Section 405 of the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code by not exercising ordinary care when it allowed Kenneth B. Wulf to open a fraudulent account.

Wulf was a resident adjustor for Auto-Owners and worked for the company for 10 years. He handled files for each case of subrogation and salvage claims and it was his responsibility to forward any checks the company received for those claims to the clerical staff to send to the company's headquarters.

In 1991, Wulf opened an account at Bank One in the name of "Auto-Owners, Kenneth B. Wulf" and the bank did not request any documents to confirm he was allowed to open and use an account in Auto-Owners' name. Over the course of eight years, he deposited more than half a million dollars into that account. While he was on vacation, Auto-Owners discovered what he had been up to.

Auto-Owners brought a suit against Bank One, arguing the bank failed to exercise ordinary care when it opened the account and that failure substantially contributed to the company's losses. It also argued Bank One was liable for losses up to the moment of discovery, regardless of any statute of limitations.

The trial court granted Bank One's motion for summary judgment and denied Auto-Owners' motion for partial summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue only. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

In today's ruling authored by Justice Frank Sullivan, the majority affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. The case and the court's decision rested upon Indiana's Uniform Commercial Code, which allows a person bearing a loss because of fraudulent activity to recover from the person failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent the loss.

Section 405 does not mention a bank's responsibilities when opening an account and only requires ordinary care from a bank in the "paying" or "taking" of an instrument, wrote Justice Sullivan. In fact, in the absence of the bank's negligence, the section shifts the responsibility of monitoring employees' activities onto the employer. The employer is in a better position to supervise its employees than the bank, he wrote.

As to the second issue raised on appeal, even if Bank One didn't demonstrate ordinary care by accepting the checks, Auto-Owners still has to show that lack of ordinary care substantially contributed to its losses. To determine whether the conduct has substantially contributed to a loss, the high court looked to I.C. 26-1-3.1-406, to view Bank One's conduct in its entirety. Other than the lack of procedure used in opening the account in 1991, Bank One followed required protocol in depositing Wulf's checks. Even if opening the account was a contributing factor to Auto-Owners' loss, the Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts that the bank's conduct in its entirety does not meet the "substantially contributed" test (Thompson Maple Products v. Citizens National Bank of Corry, 234 A.2d 32 (Pa.Super.Ct.1967)).

Justice Theodore Boehm, in a separate opinion in which Justice Brent Dickson concurred, agreed that the statute of limitations barred much of Auto-Owners' claims but did not agree Bank One is entitled to summary judgment because he believes there are issues of fact not resolvable on summary judgment.
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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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