ILNews

Sole justice disagrees with sentencing transfer

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2008
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The Indiana Supreme Court has cut an Indianapolis child molester's prison sentence in half from 120 to 60 years, reanalyzing the penalty he received for being convicted of multiple counts of victimizing his stepdaughter.

But one of the state's top jurists objected to the court accepting this sentencing case, emphasizing that reviewing and revising this penalty goes against the high court's role as one of "last resort" and could lead to trial judges being less cautious and measured in sentencing.

A 4-1 ruling came down late Thursday in Michael D. Smith v. State of Indiana, No. 49S05-0806-CR-365. The case involves four merged counts of child molesting for which Smith was originally sentenced to 120 years following a jury trial. He'd been convicted of molesting his stepdaughter four times when she was between the ages of 10 and 14, and the trial court in 2005 sentenced him to serve consecutive sentences of 30 years for each count. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in an unpublished memorandum in August 2007.

But in granting transfer and reviewing the sentencing, a majority of justices determined the sentence should be reduced based on the character of the offender and nature of the offenses. Justices relied on Smith's extensive criminal history of two sex-based offenses that echoed the current offenses, as well as "multiple, serious aggravating circumstances" that include the long period of time he molested the girl and the "heinous violation of trust" that occurred. Justices directed one of the counts be imposed consecutive to the other, with the remaining two counts be served concurrently. It left to the trial court to decide which sentences be imposed consecutively and concurrently, and that can be done without a hearing.

In making its decision, the court relied on post-2005 caselaw stemming from Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and subsequent state law changes in Indiana's sentencing scheme, specifically moving to "advisory" rather than "presumptive" sentences.

Justice Brent Dickson dissented in a separate opinion, writing that he isn't convinced that this case isn't sufficiently "rare or exceptional" to warrant appellate intrusion into the trial court's sentencing decision. He noted the court's authority to review and revise criminal sentences is a permissive option, and the state constitution doesn't compel that review.

"Any greater frequency in appellate revision of criminal sentences may induce and foster reliance upon such review for ultimate sentencing evaluations and thus serve as a disincentive to the cautious and measured fashioning of sentences by trial judges," he wrote. "Restrained sentencing decisions are best made by a trial judge with the gravity that results from knowing that the judge's decisions are essentially final."
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  1. Living in South Bend, I travel to Michigan a lot. Virtually every gas station sells cold beer there. Many sell the hard stuff too. Doesn't seem to be a big deal there.

  2. Mr. Ricker, how foolish of you to think that by complying with the law you would be ok. Don't you know that Indiana is a state that welcomes monopolies, and that Indiana's legislature is the one entity in this state that believes monopolistic practices (such as those engaged in by Indiana Association of Beverage Retailers) make Indiana a "business-friendly" state? How can you not see this????

  3. Actually, and most strikingly, the ruling failed to address the central issue to the whole case: Namely, Black Knight/LPS, who was NEVER a party to the State court litigation, and who is under a 2013 consent judgment in Indiana (where it has stipulated to the forgery of loan documents, the ones specifically at issue in my case)never disclosed itself in State court or remediated the forged loan documents as was REQUIRED of them by the CJ. In essence, what the court is willfully ignoring, is that it is setting a precedent that the supplier of a defective product, one whom is under a consent judgment stipulating to such, and under obligation to remediate said defective product, can: 1.) Ignore the CJ 2.) Allow counsel to commit fraud on the state court 3.) Then try to hide behind Rooker Feldman doctrine as a bar to being held culpable in federal court. The problem here is the court is in direct conflict with its own ruling(s) in Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings & Iqbal- 780 F.3d 728, at 730 “What Johnson adds - what the defendants in this suit have failed to appreciate—is that federal courts retain jurisdiction to award damages for fraud that imposes extrajudicial injury. The Supreme Court drew that very line in Exxon Mobil ... Iqbal alleges that the defendants conducted a racketeering enterprise that predates the state court’s judgments ...but Exxon Mobil shows that the Rooker Feldman doctrine asks what injury the plaintiff asks the federal court to redress, not whether the injury is “intertwined” with something else …Because Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predates the state litigation and caused injury independently of it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not block this suit. It must be reinstated.” So, as I already noted to others, I now have the chance to bring my case to SCOTUS; the ruling by Wood & Posner is flawed on numerous levels,BUT most troubling is the fact that the authors KNOW it's a flawed ruling and choose to ignore the flaws for one simple reason: The courts have decided to agree with former AG Eric Holder that national banks "Are too big to fail" and must win at any cost-even that of due process, case precedent, & the truth....Let's see if SCOTUS wants a bite at the apple.

  4. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

  5. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

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