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Justices rule on judicial mandate case

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In its first case since the state amended its rules last year on how judicial mandates are handled, the Indiana Supreme Court has today issued a decision about a St. Joseph Superior judge’s mandate for the county to pay for multiple items he considered necessary for running the local juvenile justice system.

Justices issued a decision today in the case of In The Matter of Mandate of Funds; St. Joseph County Commissioners And St. Joseph County Council v. The Hon. Peter J. Nemeth and the St. Joseph Probate Court, No. 71S00-0912-MF-569. Justice Frank Sullivan authored the 25-page decision, which had agreement from all his colleagues but included a brief dissent from Justices Brent Dickson and Theodore Boehm on one aspect.

Overall, neither St. Joseph Superior Judge Peter Nemeth nor the county commissioners and council emerged completely victorious as the high court delved into a multitude of complex problems and issued decisions on each aspect involving land use, renovations, and staff salaries.

Last year, a special judge ruled in favor Judge Nemeth who had issued three judicial mandates directing county officials to transfer money for pay raises and improvements for the juvenile justice center.

While this case and related mandates have played out during the past few years, this case was the first to fall under Indiana Trial Rule 60.5 that the court revised in February 2009. The mandates from Judge Nemeth followed a September 2007 ruling from the Supreme Court, which held that trial judges must work with county officials and share the decision-making of how court money is spent.

The justices reversed the special judge’s dismissal of the first mandate involving land use and possible construction of a new juvenile facility, remanding it to trial on the grounds that it shouldn’t have been dismissed. Justices both affirmed and reversed in part on Mandate 2, involving various renovations and county funds needed for those projects. The justices determined that a day reporting program expansion, juvenile-transporting vans, a washing machine to clean minors’ clothing, and carpet cleaning are all court-related expenses and should be paid for. However, the justices didn’t agree that expense for a new courtroom or needed chairs could be established by the evidence on record.

On the mandated salary hikes of $60,208 for eight employees, the justices affirmed the special judge’s finding that a bookkeeper position’s increase could be mandated but reversed the ruling that had approved raises for the other seven employees.

“This record does not show a clear and present danger of impairment of the court or court-related functions with regard to the remaining seven positions,” Justice Sullivan wrote.

With that, the Supreme Court also determined that the evidence didn’t show that the raises could be paid for with the local probation fee because it didn’t clearly fund new probation services or increases.

Additionally, the justices also determined that the appellate attorney fees in this case weren’t unreasonable and the commissioners failed to argue otherwise. Each side must bear its own appellate costs, the justices ruled.

Though Justices Dickson and Boehm agreed with most of the aspects in the case, they joined in a dissent that involved the aspect about whether the land use issue should be remanded for trial. They believed the special judge was correct to dismiss that mandate.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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