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Justices order trial on reasonable force issue

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A law enforcement officer’s use of force in excess of reasonable force authorized by statute isn't shielded from liability under the "enforcement of a law" immunity under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(8), the Indiana Supreme Court held today.


The justices ruled on the issue of immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act in Richard Patrick Wilson and Billy Don Wilson v. Gene Isaacs, Sheriff of Cass County, and Brad Craven, No. 09S05-1003-CV-149. Brothers Patrick and Billy Don Wilson sued Sheriff Gene Isaacs and Deputy Brad Craven for damages after Craven used a Taser on Richard three times, two of which happened after he was already immobile on the ground. The defendants were granted summary judgment by the trial court; the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed for Craven but reversed as to Isaac.


At issue in the appeal is whether the law enforcement immunity is available to shield the government from liability on claims of excess force. The brothers argue the government isn’t immune from liability for Craven’s conduct because disputed facts exist as to whether the deputy used unreasonable and excessive force contrary to Indiana statute.


The Supreme Court held in Kemezy v. Peters that the use of excessive force is not conduct immunized by the enforcement of a law immunity of the Indiana Tort Claims Act; the defendants argued that rule no longer applies because it was based on a public/private duty test for law enforcement immunity that was later disavowed in other caselaw.


 The high court relied on Patrick v. Miresso, 848 N.E.2d 1083 (Ind. 2006), to find that the statutory provision authorizing a law enforcement officer’s use of reasonable force only if the officer reasonably believes the force is necessary for a lawful arrest restrains the statutory immunity from erecting a shield to liability for conduct contrary to the statute, wrote Justice Brent Dickson. The justice also disapproved the contrary view expressed in City of Anderson v. Davis, 743 N.E.2d 359, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).


"Although we conclude that the law enforcement immunity of the Indiana Tort Claims Act does not shield the government from liability for excessive force by police, there remain genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Deputy Craven's conduct was reasonable and whether he reasonably believed that the force he used was 'necessary to effect a lawful arrest,'" wrote the justice.


The high court summarily affirmed summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims against Deputy Craven personally. Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard dissented without opinion.  
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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