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Justices answer certified question

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The Indiana Supreme Court Monday answered the certified question sent to them by the U.S. District Court in New York about what standard should be applied in determining whether a director is “disinterested” under Indiana Code Section 23-1-32-4(d).

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York certified the question of “What standard should be applied in determining whether a director is ‘disinterested’ within the meaning of Indiana Code § 23-1-32-4(d), and more specifically, is it the same standard as is used in determining whether a director is disinterested for purposes of excusing demand on the corporation’s directors under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 and Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993)?”

The justices accepted the question in November 2009. The question comes from the case, In re ITT Derivative Litigation, Sylvia B. Piven, et al. v. ITT Corp., et al.,  No. 94S00-0911-CQ-508. One of ITT’s business units supplies night vision equipment to the military; ITT was charged and fined because it exported military technology to other countries in violation of the U.S. State Department restrictions. The instant case is a derivative action, on behalf of ITT, brought by ITT shareholders against ITT directors. The plaintiffs want to recover the criminal fines and penalties paid, alleging that the directors violated fiduciary duties by not monitoring and supervising management of the unit.

Shareholder Robert Wilkinson didn’t make any demand on ITT’s board to pursue the claims; shareholder Anthony Reale did. The board appointed a Special Litigation Committee to consider whether the corporation should pursue the claims in question, and the District Court ruled the three, independent, outside directors appointed to the committee were not “disinterested” under I.C. Section 23-1-32-4.

The high court held that the Indiana Business Corporation Law employs the same standard for showing a “lack of disinterestedness” both as to the composition of special board committees under the statute and to the requirement that a shareholder must make a demand that the corporation’s board act unless the demand would be futile.

The District Court properly concluded that in assessing the futility of a demand, Indiana law determines whether a director is “disinterested” by asking whether a derivative claim poses a significant risk of personal liability for the director, which is the Rales standard, wrote Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard.

“Determining that a named director is ‘interested’ as respects all claims save for the outright frivolous would likely preclude most directors from serving on an SLC which considers shareholder demands,” wrote the chief justice. “Ousting directors from such roles on a broader basis than that mandated by Rales undermines the intent of Indiana’s BCL.”

Neither the statutory language nor the policies underlying the BCL suggest that the standard for showing a lack of disinterestedness under the statute should be more “plaintiff-friendly” than the showing required in the demand futility context, the justice continued.

Justice Frank Sullivan did not participate in answering the certified question.
 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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