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Court declines to review commitment cases differently

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The Indiana Court of Appeals declined Thursday to change how it reviews cases dealing with involuntary commitment.

In The matter of the commitment of S.T. v. Community Hospital North, In-Patient Psychiatric Unit, No. 49A04-0910-CV-617, 23-year-old S.T., an Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran who uses a wheelchair, appealed her temporary involuntary commitment. Although the ordered up-to-90-day commitment has already passed, the appellate court addressed her appeal anyway.

S.T. tried to kill herself by overdosing on Tylenol. S.T suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, a non-specific mood disorder, and attention deficit disorder. She also engaged in behavior associated with pica, an eating disorder in which people eat non-food items.

When staff tried to remove earrings from S.T.’s digestive tract, she ripped out her IVs and the procedure had to be stopped. She also was verbally abusive and threatening to staff members. After this, the trial court ordered the involuntary commitment.

The appellate court spent the majority of the opinion explaining why it would not reconsider the standard in which it reviews involuntary commitments, as S.T. urged.

S.T. argued for a de novo review, but the cases she cited don’t allow for the appellate court to usurp the trial court’s authority to weigh evidence and resolve factual disputes, or for the Court of Appeals to review sufficiency of evidence with no deference to the trial court, wrote Judge Melissa May.

“The determination of dangerousness under the involuntary commitment statute has always been a question of fact for the trial court to decide,” she wrote. “S.T. has not directed us to uncontroverted facts in the record that would change that determination into a question of law that we could review de novo.”

The appellate court also rejected the argument that a new standard should be adopted because the well-established one wasn’t being applied consistently. A review of 67 decisions over the last 25 years showed the opposite, noted the judge.

After explaining the standard in more detail, the appellate court affirmed S.T.’s commitment. Based on testimony from S.T. and the hospital, the court found three facts indicating she was a danger to herself: her behavior toward hospital staff due to her mental illness, her continued attitude of “hopelessness” about obtaining medication through Veterans Affairs, and the possibility of escalated risk of danger to herself as a result of pica.

Combining that with the fact she originally was admitted because of an overdose, she exhibited destructive and angry behavior while there and it was exacerbated by a nonspecific disorder and her PTSD, there was sufficient evidence to support her involuntary commitment for up to 90 days.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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