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IBA: Recent Cases Highlight Greater Protection Afforded by Indiana Constitution

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IBA Crim JusticeThe Indiana Constitution often affords criminal defendants greater protections than the U.S Constitution. In the past two months, Indiana courts have demonstrated this to be true, particularly in the context of search and seizure. As show below, in addressing these issues, Indiana courts have expressed a clear willingness to diverge from U.S. Constitutional doctrines when it comes to protecting individual rights.

“Knock-and-Announce” and “Attenuation Doctrine” Under the Indiana Constitution

In the landmark case of Hudson v. Michigan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when police officers violate the knock-and-announce rule. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). In Lacey, the Indiana Court of Appeals departed from the federal standard and found that a knock-and-announce violation may lead to the suppression of evidence.

In Lacey, the police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s residence for illegal drugs and weapons. Lacey v. State, 931 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The Police Emergency Services Team decided to execute a “no-knock” search because of the defendant’s criminal history. Id. However, this criminal history was never disclosed to a neutral magistrate. Subsequently, the police officers forcefully entered the residence using a ramming device and announced their presence as they gained entry. Id. After a search and seizure, the defendant was charged with possession of a weapon, possession of marijuana, and maintaining a common nuisance. Id. The defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search because the “no-knock” search violated his rights under the Indiana Constitution. Id.

The Indiana Court of Appeals held that “the unilateral decision to dispense with the knock-and-announce rule [was] unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution where the relevant facts could have been presented in application for a ‘no-knock’ warrant.” Lacey, 931 N.E.2d at 385. In so holding, the court observed that there were no exigent circumstances to justify a no-knock search. Id. Additionally, the court determined that the officer should have presented the defendant’s criminal history to a neutral magistrate when obtaining the warrant. Id. At 384. The court then determined that the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation was suppression of the evidence. In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis in Hudson.

In Trotter, the Indiana Court of Appeals again parted ways with the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the attenuation doctrine. Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the exclusionary rule does not apply when the connection between unlawful police conduct and the subsequent discovery of evidence “become[s] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).

In Trotter, the defendant was charged with two class D felonies for pointing a firearm and criminal recklessness after police officers unlawfully entered a pole barn and discovered the defendant pointing a firearm at them. Trotter v. State, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 1686, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2010). The defendant moved to suppress evidence, claiming that the officers’ warrantless entry into the private residence violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. At *5–6. Ultimately, the trial court determined that suppression was not required “pursuant to the attenuation doctrine exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id at *7.

On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals first determined that the officers’ warrantless entry violated both the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. Id. At *13. The Court then turned to the State’s argument that the evidence should not be suppressed because the defendants’ pointing a firearm at the officers “dissipated the taint” of the unlawful entry. Trotter, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS, at *15. The court disagreed, and held that “the attenuation doctrine as it currently exists as a separate analysis to circumvent the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment purposes has no application under the Indiana Constitution.” Id. At *17–18. Therefore, because the attenuation doctrine did not apply, suppression of the evidence was warranted. Id. At *18.

Preserving Indiana Constitutional Claims

Lacey and Trotter reinforce the need for Indiana criminal defense attorneys to properly preserve claims under the Indiana Constitution. However, in order to preserve an Indiana Constitutional claim, an attorney cannot merely object to evidence and make passing reference to the Indiana Constitution or even a specific article in the Indiana Constitution. At a minimum, when a litigant attempts to invoke Indiana Constitutional protections, the litigant must “provide a separate analysis of the state . . . [constitutional] claim or argue why it provides protection different than the federal constitution.” Valentin v. State, 688 N.E.2d 412, 413 (Ind.1997).

In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that when “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,” it is assumed that the decision was grounded on federal law. Similarly, when a defendant fails to provide a state constitutional claim “separate” from a federal claim, our state courts will “only analyze” the claim under federal standards. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 473 n. 7 (Ind. 1997) overruled on other grounds.•

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  1. The practitioners and judges who hail E-filing as the Saviour of the West need to contain their respective excitements. E-filing is federal court requires the practitioner to cram his motion practice into pigeonholes created by IT people. Compound motions or those seeking alternative relief are effectively barred, unless the practitioner wants to receive a tart note from some functionary admonishing about the "problem". E-filing is just another method by which courts and judges transfer their burden to practitioners, who are the really the only powerless components of the system. Of COURSE it is easier for the court to require all of its imput to conform to certain formats, but this imposition does NOT improve the quality of the practice of law and does NOT improve the ability of the practitioner to advocate for his client or to fashion pleadings that exactly conform to his client's best interests. And we should be very wary of the disingenuous pablum about the costs. The courts will find a way to stick it to the practitioner. Lake County is a VERY good example of this rapaciousness. Any one who does not believe this is invited to review the various special fees that system imposes upon practitioners- as practitioners- and upon each case ON TOP of the court costs normal in every case manually filed. Jurisprudence according to Aldous Huxley.

  2. Any attorneys who practice in federal court should be able to say the same as I can ... efiling is great. I have been doing it in fed court since it started way back. Pacer has its drawbacks, but the ability to hit an e-docket and pull up anything and everything onscreen is a huge plus for a litigator, eps the sole practitioner, who lacks a filing clerk and the paralegal support of large firms. Were I an Indiana attorney I would welcome this great step forward.

  3. Can we get full disclosure on lobbyist's payments to legislatures such as Mr Buck? AS long as there are idiots that are disrespectful of neighbors and intent on shooting fireworks every night, some kind of regulations are needed.

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  5. "No one is safe when the Legislature is in session."

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