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Court splits on public intoxication conviction

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The Indiana Court of Appeals split today on whether a woman’s conviction of Class B misdemeanor public intoxication should be reversed because she wasn’t in a public place within the meaning of Indiana Code at the time police stopped her car.

Brenda Moore had been drinking at her sister’s house. A friend wanted a ride, but Moore said she was unable to drive but if the friend had a valid license, he could drive her car. Moore rode with him in the passenger seat and fell asleep when police pulled the car over for a non-working license plate light. The friend didn’t have a valid license and Moore admitted she was too intoxicated to drive the car. She was arrested and charged with public intoxication and later convicted.

The issue that split the appellate court in Brenda Moore v. State of Indiana, No. 49A04-1001-CR-46, was whether there was sufficient evidence to support Moore’s conviction as defined in Indiana Code Section 7.1-5-1-3, which defines public intoxication as “being in a public place or a place of public resort in a state of intoxication caused by … use of alcohol.”

The judges relied on Miles v. State, 247 Ind. 423, 425 216 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1966), in which the Indiana Supreme Court held a man who was slumped over his steering wheel in his running tractor-trailer cab parked on the side of the highway was in a public place for purposes of the public intoxication statute.

The majority found the differences between Miles and the instant case to be significant and didn’t believe Miles compels the result that Moore was in a public place. The majority of cases following Miles have had intoxicated people in parked or stopped cars that were in places accessible to the public, wrote Judge Margret Robb.

“Here, Moore’s vehicle was being driven upon a public road by a sober driver and was causing no danger or impediment to the traveling public. The facts of this case are sufficiently different from the facts of previous cases that we believe neither Miles nor the legislature’s lack of action in the wake thereof are binding upon us,” she wrote.

Judge Robb also wrote that the purpose of the statute is to prevent intoxicated people from bothering or threatening the safety of others and that objective wouldn’t be frustrated by excluding the circumstances of this case from the definition public intoxication. She noted there are times when someone riding in a car could be charged with public intoxication, but under the circumstances of the case, Moore wasn’t intoxicated in a public place within the meaning of the statute.

In her dissent, Judge Nancy Vaidik said as much as she may disagree with criminalizing riding as a passenger in a private vehicle on a public road in a state of intoxication, that it’s up to the legislature to address this.

“Given Miles and the legislature’s lack of response to it, I believe that unless and until our legislature makes changes to Indiana Code section 7.1-5-1-3, Moore was in a public place. I therefore would affirm her conviction for public intoxication,” she wrote.





 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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