ILNews

Judges split on court's role in garnishments with pro se debtors

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals was divided on whether a trial court should assert exemptions in garnishment actions on behalf of debtors who aren’t represented by counsel.

In two opinions released today, Quincy and Shannon Branham v. Rodney Varble and Norman Chastain, No. 62A01-1004-SC-192, and Quincy and Shannon Branham v. Rodney and Carol Varble, No. 62A04-1004-SC-256, Quincy and Shannon Branham claimed the trial court acted contrary to law when it ordered them to pay $50 a month toward small-claims judgments, make repeated court appearances, and required Quincy seek five jobs per week.

The couple had trial consent judgments entered against them. They either stopped making payments or never paid toward the judgment. Ultimately they were ordered to pay $50 a month in each case. They appeared in court multiple times for each case.

In their case with the Varbles, the Branhams argued that the court “circumvented the statutory protections for earned income” by ordering them to pay $50 a month since the prior lawful garnishment order had been fruitless. The majority disagreed and upheld the order. Judge Terry Crone dissented, finding the Varbles didn’t meet their burden of showing that the Branhams had property not subject to exemptions.

In the Branhams’ case with Rodney Varble and Norman Chastain, the Branhams claimed on appeal that when a debtor is unrepresented, the court must protect the debtor’s constitutional rights and sua sponte determine what exemptions would be the least burdensome for the debtor. They didn’t enter any exemptions during the proceedings supplemental and weren’t represented by counsel. Again, the majority disagreed.

The judges split over the application of Mims v. Commercial Credit Corp., 261 Ind. 591, 307 N.E.2d 867 (1974). In Mims, the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged that the general rule is that the burden is on the debtor to claim the exemption. If the debtor is represented pro se, then the court must determine which exemption would be least burdensome.

Judge Terry Crone wrote in his dissent that he believes that Mims unambiguously requires that trial courts assert exemptions on behalf of pro se debtors and that the majority construed it far too narrowly in the instant case.

“The supreme court has neither narrowed nor disavowed Mims since it was decided in 1974, and the fact that some trial courts may not follow Mims in the workaday world does not make that case any less binding on them or on us,” he wrote.

But the majority felt that to adopt Judge Crone’s view would essentially recast the role of the judiciary from traditional decision-making to one of advocacy for the parties and that the procedure proposed in Mims was specific to the case before it. No other case has adopted the interpretation of Mims proposed by Judge Crone, wrote Judge Ezra Friedlander.  

In both cases, the judges also were divided on the repeated court appearances issue; the majority found the trial court didn’t err, while Judge Crone dissented because he felt the creditors didn’t show new facts that justified a new order or examination. He would reverse the entire order and order further proceedings supplemental stayed until the creditors could show the new facts justifying the new order.

The three judges did agree that in both cases, the trial court overstepped its authority and abused its discretion in requiring Quincy to seek alternative employment by submitting five applications a week and reversed that part of the court’s order.
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

ADVERTISEMENT