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Court addresses forgery statute on electronic credit card purchases

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Using someone else’s credit card and electronically signing that person’s name is considered “uttering” a written instrument under Indiana’s forgery statute, the state’s appellate court has ruled.

The three-judge panel unanimously reached that holding today in the case of Jessica Borjas v. State of Indiana, No. 49A02-1009-CR-1048, which hails from Marion Superior Judge Steven Rubick.

In September 2009, the Indianapolis woman went to a Family Dollar store and bought about $155 in merchandise using another person’s Visa credit card, swiping the card to process the transaction and then signing the name of the cardholder. That person had not given her permission to use the card. Neither electronic receipt reproduced the false signature, but it was stored in the system.

The state later charged Borjas with two Class C felony counts and she waived her right to a jury trial. She argued that an electronic signature after the sale – signifying that a sale had been approved electronically – did not fall within Indiana Code 35-43-5-2(b) because the sale was approved prior to her signing.

The trial judge disagreed and found her guilty on both counts.

On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted that the Indiana forgery statute specifically says that the state must prove that someone “with the intent to defraud, uttered a written instrument” without the authority to do so. The court found her argument without merit and specifically relied on a not-yet-certified ruling about three weeks ago in Green v. State, __ N.E.2d__, 2011 WL 1047053, at *2-*3 (Ind. Ct. App., March 23, 2011), that held it would run contrary to the General Assembly’s express interest to allow someone to avoid forgery convictions because of an electronic signature.

“Nonetheless, Borjas contends that the sale was completed when she received electronic approval that the funds to complete the sale were available,” the court wrote today. “That contention is not supported by citation to authority and is not otherwise persuasive. It is common knowledge that a signature may be required for a credit card transaction. When it is, the signature is not superfluous but serves to authenticate the sale.”

The judges also cited Indiana Code 26-2-8-106, in finding that a “signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”

 

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  1. My husband financed a car through Wells Fargo In dec 2007 and in Jan 2012 they took him to court to garnish his wages through a company called autovest llc . Do u think the statue of limitations apply from the day last payment was received or from what should have been the completion of the loan

  2. Andrew, you are a whistleblower against an ideologically corrupt system that is also an old boys network ... Including old gals .... You are a huge threat to them. Thieves, liars, miscreants they understand, identify with, coddle. But whistleblowers must go to the stake. Burn well my friend, burn brightly, tyger.

  3. VSB dismissed the reciprocal discipline based on what Indiana did to me. Here we have an attorney actually breaking ethical rules, dishonest behavior, and only getting a reprimand. I advocated that this supreme court stop discriminating against me and others based on disability, and I am SUSPENDED 180 days. Time to take out the checkbook and stop the arrogant cheating to hurt me and retaliate against my good faith efforts to stop the discrimination of this Court. www.andrewstraw.org www.andrewstraw.net

  4. http://www.andrewstraw.org http://www.andrewstraw.net If another state believes by "Clear and convincing evidence" standard that Indiana's discipline was not valid and dismissed it, it is time for Curtis Hill to advise his clients to get out the checkbook. Discrimination time is over.

  5. Congrats Andrew, your street cred just shot up. As for me ... I am now an administrative law judge in Kansas, commissioned by the Governor to enforce due process rights against overreaching government agents. That after being banished for life from the Indiana bar for attempting to do the same as a mere whistleblowing bar applicant. The myth of one lowly peasant with the constitution does not play well in the Hoosier state. As for what our experiences have in common, I have good reason to believe that the same ADA Coordinator who took you out was working my file since 2007, when the former chief justice hired the same, likely to "take out the politically incorrect trash" like me. My own dealings with that powerful bureaucrat and some rather astounding actions .. actions that would make most state courts blush ... actions blessed in full by the Ind.S.Ct ... here: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS

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