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Supreme Court upholds Barnes ruling

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Emphasizing that it’s not trampling on the Fourth Amendment, the Indiana Supreme Court has revisited a ruling it made four months ago and upheld its holding that residents don’t have a common law right to resist police entering a person’s home.

Adding to its earlier decision, the justices have made it clear that even the state’s castle doctrine doesn’t give individuals a right to defend themselves against officers entering their homes and then use that as a defense in court.

A five-page decision came down Tuesday morning in Richard L. Barnes v. State,  No. 82S05-1007-CR-343, with the justices granting a rehearing petition that follows the court’s May 12 ruling.

In this Vanderburgh Superior case, Richard Barnes appealed his misdemeanor convictions of battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting law enforcement, and disorderly conduct. Police responded to a 911 call by Barnes’ wife concerning domestic violence, and when they arrived the man was in the parking lot but went back inside his apartment to retrieve some personal items before leaving. When officers tried to enter, Barnes told them they couldn’t and blocked them. An officer attempted to come inside, and Barnes shoved him against the wall and a struggle ensued. He was charged and found guilty.

Barnes appealed, challenging the trial court’s refusal to give his tendered jury instruction on the right of a citizen to reasonably resist unlawful entry into the citizen’s home, and the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on the battery and resisting charges.

Previously, the justices affirmed his convictions and voted 3-2 that Indiana no longer recognizes a common law right to resist police. Justices Robert Rucker and Brent Dickson dissented at that time because they felt the ruling went too far.

But re-examining the case and issues, the court pointed out: “The petitions for rehearing, advanced by thoughtful people, have convinced us that the appropriate course is to grant rehearing and speak further on the law of this case.”

In this new decision, Justice Rucker dissented on the merits as he had previously, while Justice Dickson concurred in result with Chief Justice Randall Shepard and Justices Steven David and Frank Sullivan.

Attorneys for both sides asked the justices to reconsider their decision, the public reacted to the ruling through an opposition rally at the Indiana Statehouse, and a legislative summer study subcommittee looked at whether lawmakers should examine that issue in the future.

Writing that the holding does no more than bring Indiana common law in stride with jurisdictions that “value promoting safety in situations where police and homeowners interact,” Justice David noted that the central question in this case is whether the defendant was entitled to tell a jury that a common law right to defend one’s home against invasion was a defense against Indiana’s statute criminalizing violence against police officers.

He wrote the state’s 2006-enacted castle doctrine statute is not a defense to battery or any violence against a police officer who’s acting in his or her duties – something that Barnes had claimed in this case.

The justices had earlier cited the civil court process as a remedy for addressing concerns about police entry and whether it was legal or not, but they found the legality of a search isn’t something that should be resolved through resistance at the scene.

“We also emphasize that this holding does not alter, indeed says nothing, about the statutory and constitutional boundaries of legal entry into the home or any other place,” he wrote. “Our earlier opinion was not intended to, and did not, change that existing law about the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and papers against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Justice David added, “This also reflects the basis for our holding about defenses available to criminal defendants charged with violence against police officers: the ruling is statutory and not constitutional. The General Assembly can and does create statutory defenses to the offenses it criminalizes, and the crime of battery against a police officer stands on no different ground. What the statutory defense should be, if any, is in its hands.”

The prior decision affirming Barnes’ conviction stands.

In his dissent, Justice Rucker noted that he would have granted rehearing to explore whether state statute allows Barnes to have a jury instruction regarding police entry into his home. He voiced his disagreement with the majority’s resolution, pointing to tension between the castle doctrine and the criminal statute against committing battery on an officer.
 

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  • Barnes ruling
    I can understand the legal premise the majority used; however, my concern is the law enforcement agencies attitude when kicking in the door of the wrong house, and mayhem prevails.

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  1. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  2. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  3. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  4. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  5. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

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