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Appellate court orders hearing on judge's impartiality

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The Indiana Court of Appeals has ruled that a Monroe Circuit judge abused her discretion in denying a motion to recuse in a small claims case that involved an attorney who previously served as the judge’s election campaign committee chair.

In Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Mark Kiang d/b/a Mikado Restaurant, Sunbeam Corp., and Truffles 56 Degrees Incorporated, No. 53A05-1012-SC-790, the appellate court reversed and remanded a case involving a payment dispute between Bloomington Magazine and two advertisers, Mark Kiang and Truffles 56 Degrees. Judge Valeri Haughton in January 2010 ruled against the magazine and in favor of Kiang. The magazine’s attorneys appealed after the judge denied a motion to correct error.

While that appeal was pending, the magazine filed a motion to set aside the trial court judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(2), (3), and (8) on grounds that it had discovered Kiang’s attorney, Geoffrey M. Grodner, served as chair of the judge’s campaign committee in 2008. The attorney and judge didn’t disclose that information.

The Court of Appeals looked to the Indiana trial rules governing recusals and judicial canon 2.11, which states a judge must disqualify himself or herself in any proceedings in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The rule also states that a judge should disclose on the record any information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge doesn’t believe there is a basis for disqualification.

The Indiana court panel cited a Florida appellate decision in Neiman-Marcus Grp., Inc. v. Robinson, 829 So.2d 967, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), that made the proximity of time in which an attorney serves on a judicial campaign committee to the current litigation matter the relevant inquiry in determining whether a trial judge should grant a motion to disqualify himself or herself.

The appellate judges found that Haughton and Grodner’s relationship wasn’t so remote in time as to dispel the appearance of impropriety, particularly since the attorney filed an appearance within three months of the 2008 election and the recusal motion was within two years of the election, once the opposing counsel learned of the relationship.

Remanding the case, the appellate court wrote that the parties can introduce evidence at the hearing regarding the requirements of the Indiana Trial Rules, including whether evidence of the professional relationship between Haughton and Grodner satisfies the rule requirements on evidence being newly discovered and not something that could have been found earlier.
 

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  1. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  2. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  3. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  4. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  5. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

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