ILNews

Question about residency leads to reversal in insurance case

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Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a teenager lived with his mother or father, an appellate panel has remanded the matter for trial.

In Omni Insurance Group v. Lake Poage, Tonya Poage, Cody Bauer, Jill Bauer, Gary Bauer, and Allstate Insurance Company, No. 92A03-1105-CT-208, Omni Insurance Group appealed summary judgment for Allstate Insurance Co.; Lake and Tonya Poage; and Cody, Jill and Gary Bauer (known collectively as the Poages).

In 2008, Cody Bauer was driving a car owned by his mother, Treva Bauer, when he collided with a motorcycle driven by Lake Poage. Treva was insured by Omni, and her policy provided liability coverage to Treva, the named insured, to family members who used Treva’s car, and to anyone who used her car with her permission. But the policy excluded liability for coverage of bodily injury resulting from the use of a vehicle by “any resident, including a family member, of your household who is not listed in the Declarations page.” The policy doesn’t define “resident.”

Cody was not listed on Treva’s declarations page.

On the date of the collision, Cody was spending the night at Treva’s residence. Treva shared joint legal custody of Cody with Cody’s father. Cody had his own bedroom at both residences and kept belongings at both places. He considered both residences to be his home. At the time of the collision, Treva was moving from Churubusco to Columbia City, and when she moved Cody changed schools. Cody used his father’s address on his driver’s license and received his mail there. Cody was a listed driver on his father’s policy, but not Treva’s.

The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the policy language, if Cody was a resident of Treva’s household, Omni was entitled to summary judgment because Cody was not listed on the declarations page. If he was not a resident of Treva’s household, the Poages were entitled to summary judgment, as Cody was driving Treva’s car with her permission. Because there is a genuine issue of fact as to his residency, the court found that summary judgment was not appropriate and remanded the matter for trial.
 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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