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Opinions Dec. 13, 2012

December 13, 2012
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The following Indiana Supreme Court opinions were posted after IL deadline Wednesday.

Margaret Kosarko v. William A. Padula, Administrator of the Estate of Daniel L. Herndobler, Deceased
45S03-1206-CT-310
Civil tort. Reverses denial of motion for prejudgment interest following a jury verdict awarding Kosarko monetary damages. Holds the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute abrogates and supplants the common law prejudgment interest rules in cases covered by the statute. Remands for a prejudgment interest determination consistent with this opinion.

Jacqueline Wisner, M.D. and The South Bend Clinic, L.L.P. v. Archie L. Laney
71S03-1201-CT-7
Civil tort. Affirms denial of defendants’ motion for a new trial and the decision to deny the discretionary award of prejudgment interest. The trial court determined that the conduct of counsel did not prevent the jury from rendering a fair and just verdict. The awarding of prejudgment interest is not mandatory and is left to the discretion of the trial court.

Hassan Alsheik v. Alice Guerrero, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of I.A., Deceased
45S04-1212-CT-675
Civil tort. Reverses decision to deny Guerrero prejudgment interest based upon a defective settlement letter as the letter did comply with Indiana Code 34-51-4-6. Remands with instructions to determine whether Guerrero should be entitled to prejudgment interest. Affirms the Court of Appeals opinions relating to the second autopsy, the expert witness and the admission of photographs.

Kathy Inman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
41S01-1108-CT-515
Civil tort. Holds the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute applies to underinsured motorist coverage disputes because they are properly considered “civil actions arising out of tortious conduct” as required by I.C. 34-51-4-1. Also holds that because prejudgment interest is a collateral litigation expense, it can be awarded in excess of an insured’s UIM policy limits. Affirms finding that Inman is not entitled to prejudgment interest because the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied her request for prejudgment interest.

Today’s opinions
7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Estate of Rudy Escobedo (deceased) (Raquel Hanic, Personal Representative of Estate) v. Officer Brian Martin, et al.
11-2426
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, Judge Theresa L. Springmann.
Civil. Affirms jury verdict in favor of the defendants on the estate’s excessive force claim against the police and the city of Fort Wayne and grant of judgment as a matter of laws on qualified immunity grounds, as well as summary judgment in favor of officers Martin and Brown on the excessive force claim. Finds among other things, that the District Court did not improperly admit evidence unknown to the officers at the time they used force against Escobedo, that the court committed a harmless error when it prohibited the estate from introducing evidence at trial of Escobedo’s death for purposes of calculating damages, and the court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of officers Martin and Brown on the estate’s excessive force claim for shooting Escobedo.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Byram E. Dickes, Ruth E. Logar, Christopher S. Spiritoso, Gregory Spiritoso, Lindsey E. Dickes, Dickes Development Co., LLC, et al. v. Ronald D. Felger, and Shambaugh, Kast, Beck & Williams, LLP
02A03-1206-PL-302
Civil plenary. Affirms summary judgment in favor of Felger and the law firm on the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim. The claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Scott J. Lunsford v. State of Indiana (NFP)
34A02-1206-CR-501
Criminal. Reverses time the trial court calculated as the time remaining on Lunsford’s sentence at the time his probation was revoked and remands with instructions to resentence him to 673 days.

Uriah S. Swelfer v. State of Indiana (NFP)
45A05-1205-CR-260
Criminal. Affirms sentence for two counts of Class C felony battery and one count of Class D felony criminal mischief.

Decarlos Connell v. State of Indiana (NFP)
48A05-1203-CR-141
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class B misdemeanor visiting a common nuisance.

Kerry Wagner and Wagner Trucking, Inc. v. Rugged Enterprises, LLC (NFP)
26A05-1206-CC-333
Civil collection. Affirms denial of relief from default judgment rendered in favor of Rugged Enterprises in its action against Wagner and Wagner Trucking for repayment of money mistakenly paid to Wagner Trucking by Rugged, which Wagner refused to refund.

Joseph Majors v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1205-CR-433
Criminal. Affirms convictions of attempted murder and carrying a handgun without a license. Reverses sentencing enhancement and orders it vacated, but affirms 45-year aggregate sentence imposed.

Roseann Kwak v. Kimberly Overmyer and Marshall-Starke Development Center, Inc., West Bend Mutual Ins. Company (NFP)
75A03-1203-CT-104
Civil tort. Affirms order denying Kwak’s motion to correct error from the trial court order granting summary judgment to West Bend Mutual, the garnishee-defendant, in proceedings supplement initiated by Kwak.

Daniel A. Sage v. State of Indiana (NFP)
20A03-1206-PC-266
Post conviction. Affirms denial of post-conviction relief.

Tyler P. Hogue v. State of Indiana (NFP)
29A02-1203-CR-217
Criminal. Affirms sentence after Hogue admitted to violating his probation.

Jaconiah Fields v. State of Indiana (NFP)
89A01-1205-PC-232
Post conviction. Affirms denial of petition for post-conviction relief.

Melissa L. Freyberger v. Duane L. Freyberger (NFP)
71A03-1206-MI-252
Miscellaneous. Dismisses Melissa Freyberger’s appeal of the modification of Duane Freyberger’s parenting time rights, allowing him to take the children on a six-week vacation in Europe. Denies her request for appellate attorney fees.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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