ILNews

Opinions Dec. 19, 2012

December 19, 2012
Keywords
Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Norman W. Bernstein, et al. v. Patricia A. Bankert, et al. and Auto Owners Mutual Insurance Co.
11-1501, 11-1523
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Chief Judge Richard L. Young.
Civil. Reverses dismissal of counts I, II, III and VII. In Count I, the trustees have made a timely CERCLA claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B), to recover costs incurred pursuant
to the 2002 AOC. The trustees’ Count II “companion claim” for a declaratory judgment of CERCLA liability is therefore also reinstated. Finds that the Indiana ELA claim contained in Count III is timely, and that the declaratory judgment claim contained in Count VII is not
moot. The District Court committed no abuse of discretion in its handling of the summary judgment briefing process. Finally, affirms the District Court’s denial of Auto Owners’ motion for summary judgment on preclusion grounds. The trustees’ suit is reinstated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Indiana Supreme Court
John Kimbrough, III v. State of Indiana
45S04-1212-CR-687
Criminal. Grants transfer and affirms aggregate sentence of 80 years for multiple convictions of Class A felony child molesting. Because the trial court correctly entered its sentencing statement in compliance with the dictates of Anglemyer and because the “appropriateness” of a sentence has no bearing on whether a sentence is erroneous, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Kimbrough’s sentence. Further, Kimbrough did not seek review and revision of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule (7)(B).

Abby Allen and Walter Moore v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc.
49S02-1203-CT-140
Civil tort. Affirms trial court grant of Clarian’s motion to dismiss a putative class-action complaint alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaration that rates the hospital billed were unreasonable and unenforceable. Holds the patients’ agreement to pay “the account” in the context of Clarian’s contract to provide medical services is not indefinite and refers to Clarian’s chargemaster. Because patients’ complaint states no facts on which the trial court could have granted relief, the court properly granted Clarian’s motion to dismiss.

Hugh David Reed v. Edward Reid; Reid Machinery, Inc.; North Vernon Drop Forge, Inc.; Jennings Manufacturing Co., Inc.; Reid Metals, Inc.; Glen White; Douglas Dibble; et al.

40S01-1107-PL-436
Civil plenary. Affirms in part and reverses in part regarding summary judgment motions on Hugh David Reed’s complaint seeking damages against multiple parties on multiple grounds, including a claim for an environmental legal action after a steel fabrication company deposited solid waste onto his property. Remands for further proceedings.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Stephen W. Robertson, Ins. Comm. of the State of Indiana, on behalf of the Indiana Dept. of Ins. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Florida, n/k/a Chicago Title Ins. Co.
49A02-1110-PL-971
Civil plenary. Reverses trial court’s reversal of the administrative order directing Ticor to refund excessive premiums, pay unpaid premium taxes, and establish an internal control process to ensure the appropriate premium is charged to Ticor customers. The Indiana Department of Insurance’s interpretation of the rate statute was reasonable and the administrative hearing officer’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Remands for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

LBM Realty, LLC, d/b/a Summer Place Apartments v. Hillary Mannia
71A03-1205-PL-231
Civil plenary. Reverses grant of Mannia’s motion to dismiss LBM’s claims of breach of contract and negligence regarding a fire. Because Indiana law does not currently preclude a landlord’s insurer from bringing a subrogation claim against a tenant and because the allegations in LBM’s complaint establish a set of circumstances under which it would be entitled to relief, LBM’s complaint states claims upon which relief could be granted. Remands for further proceedings.

Larry Garmon v. State of Indiana (NFP)
48A02-1202-PC-170
Post conviction. Affirms denial of petition for post-conviction relief.

Toby Hicks v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1104-CR-328
Criminal. Affirms convictions of murder and Class C felony robbery.

Sandra R. Peters v. Wal-Mart (NFP)
93A02-1207-EX-562
Agency appeal. Affirms denial of claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

Toni L. Woods v. State of Indiana (NFP)
48A05-1204-CR-203
Criminal. Affirms order Woods serve half of her previously suspended sentence following a probation violation.
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

ADVERTISEMENT