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Opinions May 6, 2013

May 6, 2013
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May 3, 2013, Opinions:
Indiana Tax Court

Indiana MHC, LLC v. Scott County Assessor
39T10-1009-TA-52
Tax. Affirms the final determination by the Indiana Board of Tax Review that Indiana MHC failed to prove its 2007 real property assessment was incorrect. The Tax Court found that Indiana MHC’s income capitalization approach did not comply with the generally accepted appraisal principles because it did not consider the occupancy rates of comparable properties in the market.

Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation v. Indiana Dept. of Local Government Finance
49T10-0910-TA-76
Tax. Affirms Department of Local Government Finance final determination denying IndyGo’s request for an excess property tax levy for the 2007 budget year, holding that the final determination was not unlawful, unsupported by the evidence or an abuse of discretion.

Today's Opinions:
Indiana Court of Appeals

Love Jeet Kaur v. State of Indiana
29A05-1208-CR-424
Criminal. Affirms trial court denial of motion to dismiss charges of Class D felony dealing in a synthetic cannabinoid, Class D felony possession of a synthetic cannabinoid, and Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance. The panel ruled that Indiana’s synthetic drug law, I.C. § 35-31.5-2-321, was not vague as applied to Kaur and did not represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Board of Pharmacy.

Carol Raper, Executor of the Estate of Timothy Raper v. Jill A. Haber, Darrell Harvey, and Jane Harvey (NFP)
81A01-1206-TR-262
Trust. Dismisses the appeal sua sponte. The trial court’s ruling on Raper’s motion to intervene was not a final judgment under Trial Rule 54(B) or an appealable interlocutory order so the COA does not have jurisdiction and must dismiss.

Bryan Delaney v. State of Indiana (NFP)
06A01-1209-CR-435
Criminal. Affirms the trial court’s denial of Delaney’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Ruled Delaney’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of sexual misconduct with a minor as a Class B felony implicated neither substantial prejudice nor manifest injustice. Therefore it was within the discretion of the trial court to deny the motion.

Property-Owners Insurance Company v. Grandview One (NFP)
49A05-1205-CT-275
Civil tort. Reverses the trial court’s order entering partial summary judgment in favor of Grandview One and remands the matter for further proceedings. There is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to whether the evidence does or does not meet the plain meaning of the term “vacant.”

 The Indiana Supreme Court and Tax Court issued no opinions prior to IL deadline. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals issued no Indiana decisions prior to IL deadline.

 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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