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Opinions July 30, 2013

July 30, 2013
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The following opinion was released after IL deadline Monday:
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Mobile Tool International, Inc. and MTI Insulated Products, Inc. v. Davis H. Elliot Company, Inc.
12-2673
Civil. Affirms summary judgment for Mobile. Finds that the indemnity provision in the invoice did not supersede the language in the lease so Elliot was required to defend and indemnify Mobile against claims made by an injured employee.

Today's opinions:
Indiana Court of Appeals

In Re the Adoption of: P.A.H., f/k/a P..V., Minor Child, B.D. and L.H.C., v. J.H.
79A02-1302-AD-183
Adoption. Reverses trial court’s order granting post-adoption visitation to P.H.’s biological uncle, J.H. Finds the lower court lacked authority to grant post-adoption visitation rights to J.H. since he is not within any statutory category of persons entitled to visitation rights.

In Re: The Paternity of Jo.J., J.W.J., v. D.C.
29A05-1209-JP-447
Juvenile paternity. Affirms the judgment of the trial court to modify the father’s child support obligation and to jail father for contempt. The COA concludes the trial court may have erred in considering mother’s request for “temporary support” prematurely. It did not err in modifying father’s weekly child support payment.

Darla M. Brenton, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Evelyn Norfleet, Deceased v. Leslie D. Lutz
77A01-1302-ES-86
Estate, supervised. Affirms trial court’s order removing Brenton as special administrator of her mother’s estate. Brenton had successfully sought to be appointed as administrator for the sole purpose of collecting damages for wrongful death. However, when the trial court removed her as administrator after learning her brother had already been named as the executor of her mother’s estate, Brenton argued that the trial court did not comply with Indiana Code Section 29-1-10-6. This did not persuade the COA. The appeals court ruled without a valid appointment of a special administrator, there is not reason to seek removal under I.C. Section 29-1-10-6.      

Adam Miller v. State of Indiana
53A05-1211-CR-560
Criminal. Reverses trial court’s denial of Miller’s motion to suppress. Concludes the search of Miller’s backpack was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Judge Cale Bradford dissents, arguing the search of Miller’s backpack did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Further, he asserts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to reopen its evidence at the suppression hearing.  

Kevin Buckley v. State of Indiana (NFP)

49A04-1211-CR-564
Criminal. Affirms conviction for Class C felony.

Robert Marks v. State of Indiana (NFP)

62A01-1212-CR-591
Criminal. Affirms trial court’s revocation of Marks’ probation.  

Anonymous Hospital, Inc., v. Jane Doe, Et Al., and Indiana Department of Insurance (NFP)
20A03-1210-CT-426
Civil tort. Reverses and remands for further proceedings the trial court granting Doe partial summary judgment. Rules Doe’s complaint for damages falls within the purview of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.

Joseph Dowell and Angie L. Grove and Cody Rowe v. American Modern Home Insurance Company (NFP)
50A03-1211-CT-487
Civil tort. Affirms summary judgment for American Modern Home Insurance Co.

Gary Wayne Shortt v. State of Indiana (NFP)
73A01-1212-CR-590
Criminal. Affirms the denial of Shortt’s motion for earned credit time and to correct error in his sentence.

Floyd D. Stewart v. State of Indiana (NFP)

65A05-1212-CR-656
Criminal. Affirms Stewart’s conviction of two counts of Class A felony dealing in cocaine and sentence to concurrent terms of 23 years, with 21 years executed and two years suspended.  

Kendal R. Pitts v. State of Indiana (NFP)

45A03-1211-CR-492
Criminal. Affirms Pitts’ 30-year sentence for Class A felony rape.

Dominique Devon Hayes v. State of Indiana (NFP)

45A05-1211-CR-576
Criminal. Affirms Hayes’ sentence of 17 years for one count of Child Molesting as a Class B felony.  

Margaret Smith v. Kristopher Schaler (NFP)

49A05-1211-CT-552
Civil tort. Affirms trial court’s denial of Smith’s motion to dismiss Schaler’s complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Judge Nancy Vaidik dissents, arguing the trial court did err because Schaler has only pled to spoliation-of-evidence claim in his complaint and spoliation of evidence is not a recognized cause of action in Indiana.

Victor Fointno v. Clair Barnes, Et Al., (NFP)
52A05-1303-SC-126
Small Claim. Affirms trial court’s entry of judgment against Fointno and in favor of the defendants.

James A. Groff v. State of Indiana (NFP)
90A02-1211-CR-886
Criminal. Affirms Groff’s statutory no-contact order as a condition of his executed sentence following his plea of guilty to sexual misconduct with a minor, a Class B felony.  

In the Matter of the Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of M.G. & A.G. (Minor Children), and S.S.(Mother) & S.G.(Father), v. Child Advocates Inc. and Indiana Department of Child Services (NFP)
49A05-1211-JT-583
Juvenile termination. Affirms the termination of mother’s and father’s parental rights.

Truong Vu v. State of Indiana (NFP)
53A04-1207-CR-352
Criminal. Affirms Vu’s convictions for criminal deviate conduct, as a Class B felony; sexual battery, as a Class D felony; and two counts of criminal confinement, as Class D felonies. Remands with instructions for the court to correct its written sentencing statement and any related documents to include the term of probation.  

Jose F. Medina v. State of Indiana (NFP)

20A04-1210-CR-525
Criminal. Affirms Medina’s conviction of and sentence for Class A felony attempted child molesting.

Adam Sullender v. State of Indiana (NFP)
20A03-1212-CR-554
Criminal. Affirms Sullender’s sentence for Class C felony battery of a pregnant woman and Class D felony strangulation.
 
Martez Brown v. State of Indiana (NFP)
48A02-1212-CR-1007
Criminal. Affirms Brown’s 150-year sentence after being convicted of two counts of murder and one count of Class B felony robbery.

Billy Ray Mead v. State of Indiana (NFP)
03A01-1301-CR-33
Criminal. Affirms trial court’s revocation of Mead’s probation and order for him to serve his previously suspended five-year sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction with credit for time served.  

The Indiana Supreme Court and Tax Court release no opinions prior to IL deadline. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals released no Indiana decisions prior to IL deadline.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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