Opinions Jan. 30, 2014

January 30, 2014
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Indiana Court of Appeals
In Re: The Matter of C.L., a Delinquent v. State of Indiana
Juvenile. Reverses adjudication that C.L. is delinquent for committing what would be Class A misdemeanor intimidation if committed by an adult. It was not established that C.L. committed intimidation for a prior lawful act. The evidence established that the alleged threats C.L. directed toward his grandfather were aimed at influencing future conduct, rather that in retaliation for past conduct. Judge Najam dissents.

Alexis Hutchison and Martha Farber, deceased and Trilogy Health Services, LLC, d/b/a Springhurst Health Campus
Small claim. Reverses judgment in favor of Springhurst Health Campus on its claim against Hutchinson and her now-deceased mother, Martha Farber, for payment of services provided to Farber while she was a resident at Springhurst. Hutchison agreed “to pay the Facility the full amount of the Resident’s income and resources that the Responsible Party/Agent controls or accesses,” and there was no evidence presented that she ever had access to or control of Farber’s income or resources from which to make payment to Springhurst. Remands for judgment to be entered in favor of Hutchinson.

Joel Stoffel v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Federal National Mortgage Association
Mortgage foreclosure.  Affirms the trial court’s rejection of Stoffel’s argument that Fannie Mae’s satisfaction of judgment prohibited Fannie Mae from introducing evidence to show the correct amount of the agreed judgment. Reverses the trial court’s calculation of the amount of the agreed judgment, which the trial court determined after considering inadmissible evidence. Considering only the admissible evidence, holds that the amount of Fannie Mae’s credit bid exceeded the amount of the agreed judgment by $374.58. Remands with instructions that the trial court enter judgment for Stoffel in the amount of $374.58.

Edward Lee Matthys v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms termination from county re-entry court program and placement in the Department of Correction.

Lincolnshire Healthcare Operations Company, LLC, Lincolnshire Healthcare Center, Inc., and Tender Loving Care Management, Inc. v. The Estate of Dora Berry, by Personal Representative Rita Claxton (NFP)
Civil tort. Reverses denial of Lincolnshire’s motion to compel arbitration. Remands for further proceedings.

In the Matter of the Adoption of T.G.: D.G. v. M.C. (NFP)
Adoption. Affirms order that father’s consent to adoption was not required.

Derrick Barbour v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle with a BAC greater than or equal to 0.15 and an infraction for driving with a suspended license.

Joseph K. Buelna v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction and sentence for Class A felony manufacturing methamphetamine.

John Wallace v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

John McLaughlin v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms denial of motion to suppress.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of T.K. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Richard L. Roudebush VA Medical Center (NFP)
Mental health. Affirms involuntary commitment to the VA Medical Center.

John Kryza v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class C misdemeanor OWI with an alcohol concentration equivalent of at least 0.08 grams but less than 0.15 grams of alcohol and Class C misdemeanor OWI.

Casey M. Jordan v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms sentence for conviction for indirect contempt of court arising from the violation of a no-contact order.

The Indiana Supreme Court and Tax Court posted no opinions at IL deadline. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals posted no Indiana opinions by IL deadline.


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  1. Lori, you must really love wedding cake stories like this one ... happy enuf ending for you?

  2. This new language about a warning has not been discussed at previous meetings. It's not available online. Since it must be made public knowledge before the vote, does anyone know exactly what it says? Further, this proposal was held up for 5 weeks because members Carol and Lucy insisted that all terms used be defined. So now, definitions are unnecessary and have not been inserted? Beyond these requirements, what is the logic behind giving one free pass to discriminators? Is that how laws work - break it once and that's ok? Just don't do it again? Three members of Carmel's council have done just about everything they can think of to prohibit an anti-discrimination ordinance in Carmel, much to Brainard's consternation, I'm told. These three 'want to be so careful' that they have failed to do what at least 13 other communities, including Martinsville, have already done. It's not being careful. It's standing in the way of what 60% of Carmel residents want. It's hurting CArmel in thT businesses have refused to locate because the council has not gotten with the program. And now they want to give discriminatory one free shot to do so. Unacceptable. Once three members leave the council because they lost their races, the Carmel council will have unanimous approval of the ordinance as originally drafted, not with a one free shot to discriminate freebie. That happens in January 2016. Why give a freebie when all we have to do is wait 3 months and get an ordinance with teeth from Day 1? If nothing else, can you please get s copy from Carmel and post it so we can see what else has changed in the proposal?

  3. Here is an interesting 2012 law review article for any who wish to dive deeper into this subject matter: Excerpt: "Judicial interpretation of the ADA has extended public entity liability to licensing agencies in the licensure and certification of attorneys.49 State bar examiners have the authority to conduct fitness investigations for the purpose of determining whether an applicant is a direct threat to the public.50 A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services as provided by § 35.139.”51 However, bar examiners may not utilize generalizations or stereotypes about the applicant’s disability in concluding that an applicant is a direct threat.52"

  4. We have been on the waiting list since 2009, i was notified almost 4 months ago that we were going to start receiving payments and we still have received nothing. Every time I call I'm told I just have to wait it's in the lawyers hands. Is everyone else still waiting?

  5. I hope you dont mind but to answer my question. What amendment does this case pretain to?