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Judges: No credit time for repeatedly violating supervised release

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In a case of first impression for the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, the court agreed with its fellow Circuit courts that prior time served for violations of supervised release is not credited toward nor limits the statutory maximum a court may impose for subsequent violations of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e)(3).

The issue arose in United States of America v. Steven J. Perry, 13-2182, in which the District Court in South Bend sentenced Steven Perry to a 5-year term of imprisonment as well as a 10-year term of supervised release in 2013. This was the second time Perry had violated the terms of his supervised release imposed in 2005 based on his 2003 offense. The probation officer mistakenly stated in his report that Perry was subject to the statutory minimum five-year term of imprisonment mandated by the current version of Section 3583(k).

But this was an error, the 7th Circuit held, because Perry was subject to the version of this statute in effect at the time of his initial offense. That version of Section 3583(k) authorized a maximum sentence of only two years; the amended version the probation officer relied on did not take effect until July 27, 2006, and is not retroactive.

Perry argued that this maximum two-year term of imprisonment should be reduced by three months that he served in prison in 2009 for a prior violation of his supervised release. The statute he relies on 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e)(3) was amended in 2003 to include the phrase “on any such revocation.” Before the amendment was added, the Circuit courts interpreted this statute to allow credit time toward the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by statute. But since that amendment, every appellate court to address this issue has determined that language eliminates the credit time. The 7th Circuit agreed with its fellow Circuit courts.

The judges remanded for the District Court to sentence Perry to no more than two years imprisonment and to determine his conditions of supervision.
 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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