ILNews

Inside the Criminal Case: Can a defendant be convicted for being ‘annoying?’

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Inside CC Bell GaerteIn 2012, the General Assembly amended Indiana’s public intoxication statute to provide, in part, that a person was guilty of public intoxication if the individual is intoxicated “in a public place” and “annoys … another person.” Indiana Code §7.1-5-1-3(a)(4). But what constitutes “annoying?”

The Supreme Court of the United States once noted that “[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others.” Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). Sometimes the wives of the authors of this article find us annoying when we deem ourselves to be objectively hilarious. If publicly intoxicated, can a police officer’s annoyance really result in the criminal conviction of another? The recent case of Morgan v. State addresses this issue.

Rodregus Morgan was thought to be drunk before he fell asleep at an Indianapolis bus shelter on Ohio Street. Morgan v. State, No. 49A02-1304-CR-386, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 51 at *2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013). Morgan and his brother were the only two occupants of the shelter, and his brother was yelling at Morgan in order to wake him up. Id. at *2. The commotion attracted the attention of Officer Garner, an off-duty police officer working private security for the bus company, but who was nonetheless dressed in an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department uniform. Id. at *1-2.

Officer Garner approached Morgan and noticed that Morgan was exhibiting signs of being intoxicated. Id. at *3. Garner also noted that Morgan was “unsteady on his feet” and his “behavior was annoying.” Officer Garner therefore arrested Morgan for public intoxication. Id. After being handcuffed, Morgan continued to yell at Officer Garner asking him if “he was ‘happy with [himself] for locking a brother up’” and insisted that he would kick Officer Garner’s “ass just like he did in high school.” Id. at *3-4. However, Garner and Morgan had not, in fact, been classmates. Id.

The public intoxication statute, as applied to Morgan, makes it a Class B misdemeanor if a person is intoxicated while in public and “harasses, annoys or alarms another person.” Indiana Code §7.1-5-1-3(a)(4). On appeal, Morgan argued that the term “annoy” is unconstitutionally vague in that there is no objective definition of what conduct is proscribed and that the term allows for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Morgan at *6. In response, the state argued that “a person of ordinary intelligence would know that lying drunk in a public bus shelter … would annoy others” especially in conjunction with that person’s refusal to move when asked to do so. Id. at *9.

Personally, the authors of this article have walked past this particular bus shelter on numerous occasions and have never been annoyed by the conduct of others. However, we have never asked anyone to move from the bus shelter. Furthermore, no one has ever declared that we have “ordinary intelligence.”

On review, the Court of Appeals found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at *15. The appellate court cited three reasons for this determination: First, the statute does not require a defendant’s specific intent to annoy. Id. Second, it does not use an objective standard to assess whether a defendant’s conduct was annoying. Id. Third, the statute did not mandate that the defendant be warned that his behavior was annoying. Id. As a consequence, the statute allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement “because the illegality of any conduct – no matter how trivial or how substantial – is based solely on the subjective feelings of a particular person at any given time.” Id. Therefore, according to the Court of Appeals, a Hoosier may not be convicted under the subjective standard of “annoying.”•

__________

James J. Bell and K. Michael Gaerte are attorneys with Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP. They assist lawyers and judges with professional liability and legal ethics issues. They also practice in criminal defense and are regular speakers on criminal defense and ethics topics. They can be reached at jbell@bgdlegal.com or mgaerte@bgdlegal.com. The opinions expressed are those of the authors.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT