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Justices uphold sentence, clarify previous caselaw

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The Indiana Supreme Court accepted a case to address the proposition that relying on an element of the offense as an aggravating factor when sentencing is no longer prohibited. The justices believe that the Court of Appeals has applied this position too broadly.

Joshua Gomillia, while on drugs, decided with two friends to rob a house to make up some money lost while gambling. Gomillia picked the Indianapolis home and he and Lebronze Myles broke into E.K.’s home, sexually assaulted her and stole property and her car. Gomilla agreed to plead guilty to one count of Class A felony criminal deviate conduct and Class B felony robbery in exchange for his executed sentence being capped at 40 years.

When he was sentenced, the trial court commissioner cited in aggravation the circumstances of the crime and the terror Gomillia inspired in the victim. He received an executed sentence of 40 years. Gomillia argued those two factors cited by the commissioner are essentially elements of the offenses, so they cannot be used to enhance his sentence above the advisory sentence. The Court of Appeals cited Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 2008) in finding that relying on an element of the offense as an aggravating factor is no longer prohibited.

Since Townsend v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ind. 1986), courts have relied upon the rule outlined in it that a material element of an offense may not constitute an aggravating circumstance to support an enhanced sentence. But in Pedraza, the justices said a trial court’s finding of the existence of an aggravating factor to elevate a criminal charge based on the same prior conviction is not an inappropriate double enhancement.

“Citing Pedraza in support several panels of the Court of Appeals have taken the position that trial courts are no longer prohibited from considering material elements of an offense when considering aggravating circumstances at sentencing. We believe this is too broad a reading of
Pedraza,” Justice Robert Rucker wrote.

Double enhancements aside, the justices held Tuesday that the use of a material element of an offense as a reason for the sentence a trial court imposes can be “improper as a matter of law” in some circumstances.

“[W]e have consistently said ‘the advisory sentence [under the current statutory regime] is the starting point the Legislature selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed,’” Rucker continued. “… under the current statutory regime the Legislature has determined the appropriate advisory sentence based upon the elements of the offense. Where a trial court’s reason for imposing a sentence greater than the advisory sentence includes material elements of the offense, absent something unique about the circumstances that would justify deviating from the advisory sentence, that reason is ‘improper as a matter of law.’ Nothing in Pedraza should be understood to alter this basic premise.”
 
But in Gomillia’s case, the nature and circumstances of the crime included the trial court’s discussion of the leadership role he played in the commission of these offenses, as well as the terror the victim suffered. Both are appropriate reasons for justifying a sentence greater than the advisory term, the justices held in Joshua Gomillia v. State of Indiana, 49S02-1408-CR-521.

 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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