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Beyers: Law makes dishonesty legal on applications

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Indiana Lawyer Commentary

By Bill Beyers

beyers-bill-mug Beyers

This year, the Legislature made it easier for persons with a criminal history to obtain employment. Under Ind. Code 35-38-8, a person can petition the sentencing court to restrict access to his or her arrest and conviction records to all but law enforcement for a Class D felony or misdemeanor conviction that did not result in personal injuries. The court’s order would apply to state law enforcement agencies, the Indiana Department of Corrections, and state criminal records repositories.

To qualify for restricted access, eight years must have passed since the completion of the sentence and the person must have received no interim felonies. Perhaps the most perplexing part of the law is that, once a court grants the petition, the person “may legally state on an application for employment or any other document that the person has not been arrested for or convicted of the felony or misdemeanor recorded in the restricted records.” I.C. 35-38-8-7.

The primary goals of I.C. 35-38-8 were to boost employment and prevent recidivism among persons with a prior conviction. Obviously, the Legislature was concerned that employers were using prior convictions as a screening tool and that existing law was not strong enough to deter this prohibited hiring practice. An example of a screening tool would be automatically excluding all applicants with a prior conviction. Additionally, the Legislature may have been concerned that potential applicants, because of their prior conviction, were no longer employable for certain types of positions based an employer’s selective policy. For example, a bank would likely exclude a bank teller applicant with a theft conviction. The difference between a screening tool and a selective policy excluding applicants with certain types of convictions is that the selective policy is based on a business necessity whereas a screening tool arbitrarily excludes applicants solely for their prior conviction without relating the nature of the conviction to the job duties.

Before this new law, a selective policy based on a business necessity would have been permissible, but an arbitrary screening policy would have been against Title VII.

In 1987, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued an opinion stating that employers could not use prior convictions as an absolute screening tool because it had a disparate impact among minorities; however, employers could consider the conviction if it related to a business necessity. Thus, this new law will not impose a new regulation on employers to prohibit them from using an arbitrary screening policy, but it will make it more difficult by restricting access to the conviction. Further, it may also undermine the employer’s interest in excluding applicants based on a business necessity.

In accordance with statutory interpretation principles, a court will attempt to construe I.C. 35-38-8-7 so that it has purpose and meaning. However, adding the protection of allowing applicants to legally lie on the application does not provide any more protection than applicants had before the law because most employment applications are not under oath. This begs the question of how a court may interpret this provision so that it has purpose and effect. Potentially, a court may interpret it as a new regulation on employers.

Simply put, if the applicant legally lies about a restricted conviction, the employer cannot terminate or refuse to hire the applicant based on that legal dishonesty. If interpreted in this manner, it may, in practice, impair employers from implementing a policy of discriminating against applicants based on a business necessity. Importantly, once the applicant restricts the conviction, the only way for the employer to learn of the conviction would be from the applicant. The Legislature apparently realized this and may have included I.C. 35-38-8-7 so that the applicant could lie with impunity whereas without this provision the applicant may have a much greater fear of being fired later for dishonesty. Interestingly, a strict interpretation of I.C. 35-38-8-7 may also allow the applicant to lie on a sworn application or “other documents.”

Until a court interprets I.C. 35-38-8-7, it will be difficult for attorneys to advise applicants as to whether they can lie to employers with impunity. Similarly, attorneys advising employers may have to caution their clients before terminating an employee for a “legal” lie because such action may result in a lawsuit for wrongful termination. Perhaps a better solution until the issue is resolved may be to adopt a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy where hiring managers do not ask about nonviolent felonies or misdemeanor convictions in the last eight years and the applicant does not volunteer that information. This way the applicant does not have to lie about a restricted offense, and a background check will reveal any unrestricted convictions so that the employer can make an appropriate and permissible decision.•

Bill Beyers graduated in 2009 from Indiana University School of Law – Indianapolis and is an associate at Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons. The opinions expressed in this column are the author’s.
 

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  • Supreme Court Guidance
    The Supreme Court has instructed its trial courts and provided helpful practice pointers. See http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/pubs/trial-court/39-restrict-access.pdf

    Notably, the guide states that this new law is "an order restricting access [and] not the same as an expungement."
  • Law Not Understood
    In the present issue of this paper is a commentary stating that a law makes dishonesty legal.

    It may be that the writer does not understand the Law of Indiana as it applies to judgments in criminal cases.

    For many years there has been a provision of the Indiana Code that permits a Court to expunge a Court Record in certain situations. It is also possible to expunge a juvenile record, arrest record and other data.

    The statute cited has no bearing on lying or making it legal to lie. It is directed to the judgment entry of the trial Court.

    In the example set out by Mr. Beyers, a judgment was rendered on the date of a defendants' sentencing hearing.

    After eight years that defendant is allowed to file a petition under the new law. The Statute clearly expunges that record with the sole exception being the use by law enforcement.

    Under Indiana Law, if such a petition is granted, it would not be a lie to state on a job application that no prior arrest and conviction exists because it does not exist.

    The correct conclusion is that the Legislature has enabled a Court to alter the judgment in certain cases. Once it does so that judgment is altered wherein it no longer constitutes a criminal arrest or conviction---period.

    The fact that may confuse the writer is that law enforcement still has access to the historical record of the conviction. Of course that would be the case unless the Legislature wanted to alter a myriad of current statutes relating, inter alia, to habitual offender or substance abuse, license eligibility and so forth. It chose not to do that.

    The prospective employer has full access to the record made by any applicant but they do not have the power to alter a judgment issued
    by an Indiana Court. The Indiana Legislature has directed that only a trial court may do that.

    The focus here is not on a former conviction; rather it clearly is on the nature of a judgment in certain narrowly defined circumstances which is left to the discretion of a trial judge as to the existance of that verdict and judgment of criminal conviction.

    Once a Judge seals that record the Law of Indiana is that there exists no judgment of conviction or arrest and a statement to that effect is the truth.

    This situation is best handled by the sound discretion of a judge of competent jurisdiction and not a prospective employer or their attorney.

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  1. Bob Leonard killed two people named Jennifer and Dion Longworth. There were no Smiths involved.

  2. Being on this journey from the beginning has convinced me the justice system really doesn't care about the welfare of the child. The trial court judge knew the child belonged with the mother. The father having total disregard for the rules of the court. Not only did this cost the mother and child valuable time together but thousands in legal fees. When the child was with the father the mother paid her child support. When the child was finally with the right parent somehow the father got away without having to pay one penny of child support. He had to be in control. Since he withheld all information regarding the child's welfare he put her in harms way. Mother took the child to the doctor when she got sick and was totally embarrassed she knew nothing regarding the medical information especially the allergies, The mother texted the father (from the doctors office) and he replied call his attorney. To me this doesn't seem like a concerned father. Seeing the child upset when she had to go back to the father. What upset me the most was finding out the child sleeps with him. Sometimes in the nude. Maybe I don't understand all the rules of the law but I thought this was also morally wrong. A concerned parent would allow the child to finish the school year. Say goodbye to her friends. It saddens me to know the child will not have contact with the sisters, aunts, uncles and the 87 year old grandfather. He didn't allow it before. Only the mother is allowed to talk to the child. I don't think now will be any different. I hope the decision the courts made would've been the same one if this was a member of their family. Someday this child will end up in therapy if allowed to remain with the father.

  3. Ok attorney Straw ... if that be a good idea ... And I am not saying it is ... but if it were ... would that be ripe prior to her suffering an embarrassing remand from the Seventh? Seems more than a tad premature here soldier. One putting on the armor should not boast liked one taking it off.

  4. The judge thinks that she is so cute to deny jurisdiction, but without jurisdiction, she loses her immunity. She did not give me any due process hearing or any discovery, like the Middlesex case provided for that lawyer. Because she has refused to protect me and she has no immunity because she rejected jurisdiction, I am now suing her in her district.

  5. Sam Bradbury was never a resident of Lafayette he lived in rural Tippecanoe County, Thats an error.

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