ILNews

Boy can't sue for lack of probable cause

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals declined to decide whether Indiana provides a plaintiff an adequate post-deprivation remedy despite the state's recognition of an affirmative immunity defense for government workers acting in the scope of their employment.

In Michael Tully v. Rush County Prosecutor Paul Barada, et al., No. 09-3237, Michael Tully sued prosecutor Paul Barada and probation officer Catherine Custer under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming they violated his Fourth and 14th Amendment rights by summoning him to court and initiating juvenile proceedings without probable cause. A deputy sheriff stopped the car Tully and a friend were in to investigate shots fired in the area. In the car he found a spotlight, rifle, and dead raccoon. The boys admitted they knew it was wrong to shoot from a roadway.

Tully was adjudicated as a delinquent child, but the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed due to insufficient evidence. Tully then filed his federal claims. The District Court dismissed, ruling that a court summons is not a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and there isn't a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause.

The United States Supreme Court hasn't recognized nor foreclosed the possibility of plausibly asserting a right not to be prosecuted without probable cause under Section 1983. One reason why this issue remains "uncrystallized" among Courts of Appeals is because prosecutors can render the question moot by claiming absolute immunity, wrote Judge William Bauer. But Barada and Custer failed to raise that defense in the District Court. In fact, Tully overcame the affirmative defenses of absolute immunity, the existence of probable cause, and res judicata because Barada and Custer waived all of them.

"So we must reach the merits of the issue to which the parties devote their arguments, which is whether a plaintiff may assert a federal right not to be summoned into court and prosecuted without probable cause, under either the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Procedural Due Process Clause," wrote the judge.

But the answer is no, because a plaintiff can't initiate a Section 1983 claim asserting only that he was summoned and prosecuted without probable cause. Judge Bauer cautioned that the holding shouldn't be misconstrued to deny rights to parties in which prosecutors or other officials falsely accuse, tamper with evidence, or commit other independent constitutional violations that Tully didn't allege in his complaint.

Tully's claim is more like one for "negligent prosecution, but the 7th Circuit elected not to decide whether he has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in Indiana, where it recognizes an affirmative immunity defense.

"We find that Tully was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment merely by being summoned to appear in court, and that he received procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when the state court system vindicated him. To the extent any harm to his reputation remains, his recourse is to expunge the juvenile court's records," wrote Judge Bauer.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Living in South Bend, I travel to Michigan a lot. Virtually every gas station sells cold beer there. Many sell the hard stuff too. Doesn't seem to be a big deal there.

  2. Mr. Ricker, how foolish of you to think that by complying with the law you would be ok. Don't you know that Indiana is a state that welcomes monopolies, and that Indiana's legislature is the one entity in this state that believes monopolistic practices (such as those engaged in by Indiana Association of Beverage Retailers) make Indiana a "business-friendly" state? How can you not see this????

  3. Actually, and most strikingly, the ruling failed to address the central issue to the whole case: Namely, Black Knight/LPS, who was NEVER a party to the State court litigation, and who is under a 2013 consent judgment in Indiana (where it has stipulated to the forgery of loan documents, the ones specifically at issue in my case)never disclosed itself in State court or remediated the forged loan documents as was REQUIRED of them by the CJ. In essence, what the court is willfully ignoring, is that it is setting a precedent that the supplier of a defective product, one whom is under a consent judgment stipulating to such, and under obligation to remediate said defective product, can: 1.) Ignore the CJ 2.) Allow counsel to commit fraud on the state court 3.) Then try to hide behind Rooker Feldman doctrine as a bar to being held culpable in federal court. The problem here is the court is in direct conflict with its own ruling(s) in Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings & Iqbal- 780 F.3d 728, at 730 “What Johnson adds - what the defendants in this suit have failed to appreciate—is that federal courts retain jurisdiction to award damages for fraud that imposes extrajudicial injury. The Supreme Court drew that very line in Exxon Mobil ... Iqbal alleges that the defendants conducted a racketeering enterprise that predates the state court’s judgments ...but Exxon Mobil shows that the Rooker Feldman doctrine asks what injury the plaintiff asks the federal court to redress, not whether the injury is “intertwined” with something else …Because Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predates the state litigation and caused injury independently of it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not block this suit. It must be reinstated.” So, as I already noted to others, I now have the chance to bring my case to SCOTUS; the ruling by Wood & Posner is flawed on numerous levels,BUT most troubling is the fact that the authors KNOW it's a flawed ruling and choose to ignore the flaws for one simple reason: The courts have decided to agree with former AG Eric Holder that national banks "Are too big to fail" and must win at any cost-even that of due process, case precedent, & the truth....Let's see if SCOTUS wants a bite at the apple.

  4. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

  5. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

ADVERTISEMENT