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COA: Admittance of juvenile’s statement harmless error

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The Indiana Court of Appeals was divided Thursday over whether a 12-year-old boy accused of child molesting and his mother were afforded the opportunity to have a meaningful consultation before speaking to police. The judges did agree that the boy’s adjudication should be affirmed.

The court record shows that J.L., who was 12 years old, asked 6-year-old F.R. on May 26, 2012, if he wanted “to have a gay party,” and F.R. said “no.” J.L. persisted, F.R. did not cooperate, and J.L. then touched F.R.’s penis by placing his hand over F.R.’s clothing and squeezing F.R.’s penis for “one minute.” J.L. asked F.R. if he liked it, and F.R. responded “no.” Later that night, F.R. attempted to wake his father to tell him what had occurred, but J.L. prevented him from doing so. F.R. told his mother when he returned to her house at the end of the weekend.

J.L. and his mother went to the police in January 2013 to discuss the incident with Indianapolis Metropolitan Police detective Robin Meyers. J.L.’s mother does not speak English, so an officer interpreted for her and she was provided the juvenile waiver form in Spanish. Meyers told J.L. and his mother they could have time to talk together if they wanted, but officers never left the room and never stopped recording the interview. J.L. and his mother eventually agreed to talk in which J.L. admitted to touching the boy’s penis.

F.R. also testified about the incident. J.L. was found to have committed what would be Class C felony child molesting if committed by an adult. He appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his statement to police and that the evidence doesn’t sustain his adjudication.  

In J.L. v. State of Indiana, 49A04-1306-JV-297, Judges Elaine Brown and Margret Robb found J.L. and his mother did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to meaningful consultation, citing the evidence that police never left the room and the interview continued to be recorded. But that error was harmless, Brown wrote.

“[H]ere the evidence reveals that J.L. taught F.R. about ‘gay parties’ and asked F.R. if he enjoyed it when J.L. touched his penis. Such conduct supports the inference that J.L. intended to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires,” Brown wrote. “Under these circumstances, we conclude that the State presented evidence of a probative nature from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that J.L. committed an act that would constitute child molesting as a class C felony if committed by an adult.”

Judge Barnes concurred in result, believing that the meaningful opportunity to confer was extended, considered and knowingly and voluntarily waived as contemplated by I.C. 31-32-5-2.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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