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COA affirms doctrine of transferred intent applies

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The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed that the doctrine of transferred intent applied in the case of a juvenile adjudicated for committing battery for hitting his teacher unintentionally when trying to punch another student.

While at school, D.H. got into an argument with another student in class. Teacher Joanne Cornett decided to kick the other student out and move D.H. to another part of the room. As she reached for the doorknob, D.H. threw a punch at the other student and hit Cornett in the head. D.H. was placed on probation with special conditions for committing what would be Class D felony battery on a school employee and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct if committed by an adult.

D.H. argued in D.H. v. State of Indiana, No. 49A05-1002-JV-92, that there’s not enough evidence to show he knowingly or intentionally hit his teacher. He claimed the doctrine of transferred intent shouldn’t apply because the crime he would have been charged with if he hit the student versus the crime he was charged with for hitting his teacher weren’t on the same punishment level. Hitting the other student would have been the equivalent of a Class A or B misdemeanor; hitting his teacher was a Class D felony.

The appellate court wasn’t persuaded by D.H.’s argument. The state isn’t required to prove he knowingly or intentionally struck his teacher; the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he knowingly or intentionally hit someone. Then the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the victim was his teacher in the course of her duties, which elevates the offense.

“We find that the fact that the victim of a battery is a school employee in the course of her duties is akin to a battery causing a serious bodily injury—it is an aggravating circumstance that increases the penalty for the crime,” wrote Chief Judge John Baker. “Thus, while the State is required to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt, it need not prove that D.H. acted with the requisite culpability with respect to this fact.”
 

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  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

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