ILNews

COA affirms on rehearing its ruling against Bloomington dry cleaner

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected on rehearing a Bloomington dry cleaner’s request that it reconsider its August ruling that went against him.

An appellate panel granted rehearing in James T. Mitchell v. 10th And The Bypass, LLC, and Elway, Inc., 53A01-1112-PL-593, in which the COA affirmed a Monroe Circuit ruling that vacated partial summary judgment in favor of Mitchell. On Tuesday, the COA issued an opinion affirming its ruling.

“We grant Mitchell’s petition to address his contention that our opinion misunderstands and mischaracterizes his argument. We think not,” Judge Edward Najam wrote for the panel. “After careful consideration, we conclude that on rehearing Mitchell attempts to adjust and supplement his original argument, which he cannot do.”

Mitchell had been sued in an action that claimed environmental damage resulting from a dry cleaning business in which he was involved.

In January 2010, the trial court granted Mitchell’s request for partial summary judgment. The LLC later asked the court to vacate that motion after presenting evidence from a former employee who testified to chemical spills, and the court vacated its earlier order.

Mitchell contended the appellate panel allowed the abuse of discretion standard of review to dictate the outcome and to create “bad law,” and he challenged the COA’s reliance on the plain meaning of Indiana Trial Rule 54(B) regarding judgment upon multiple claims involving multiple parties.

“And Mitchell chides us for not adopting federal practice on how a trial court should handle new evidence when reconsidering a partial summary judgment under federal Rule 54(B),” Najam wrote. The court rejected those and other arguments on rehearing.

“In sum, we understood and decided this appeal based on the facts and argument originally presented by the parties. Our opinion applying Trial Rule 54(B) recognizes the inherent distinction between an interlocutory order and a final judgment and underscores that a party who wants to avoid the risk that an interlocutory order will be revised ‘at any time’ under Rule 54(B) should ask the court to enter the order as a final judgment,” Najam wrote.

“Without reweighing the evidence, we are satisfied that the factors the trial court identified in its decision to set aside the previous interlocutory order are more than sufficient to demonstrate that the court did not abuse its discretion. As such, we affirm our opinion.”


 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

ADVERTISEMENT