ILNews

COA applies sports injury conduct rule

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Less than three months after the Indiana Supreme Court issued a decision about sports injury cases, the state’s intermediate appellate court is now applying the new rule regarding how liability should be determined.

The Court of Appeals issued a decision Thursday in Cynthia Ann Welch v. Shawn D. Young, et al., No. 79A02-1012-CT-1407, involving a youth baseball game injury case that wound up in Tippecanoe Circuit Court.

Cynthia Welch, who was “Team Mom” for her son’s Wea Summer Recreation youth baseball team, was handing out bubble gum to the players during a game on May 30, 2007. She walked by the dugout where Jordan Young,  the 11-year-old son of team coach Shawn Young, was warming up “on deck” with practice swings outside the dugout, and his bat hit Welch in the knee.

Though the appellate decision doesn’t outline what her injuries were or what happened next, Welch filed a complaint alleging various theories of liability against the coach, as well as the McCutcheon Youth Baseball League and Wea Summer Recreation and Wea Summer Recreation Center. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment for all the defendants. Specifically, the court in August 2010 found that the action against Shawn Young was barred by Indiana Code 34-13-3-5(b) because his employer, Wea Township, is a governmental entity, and the Wea Summer Recreation defendants were not liable for the child’s negligence. The local court also noted Welch hadn’t argued Shawn Young was liable in any individual capacity, and it later found that she was a “participant” in the sporting event because of her role as “Team Mom” and that she’d incurred the risks.

But on appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the “participant” determination because of the Indiana Supreme Court’s ruling from May in Cassie E. Pfenning v. Joseph E. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. 2011), a golf ball injury case in which the justices on first impression adopted a standard that summary judgment is appropriate when a sports participant is acting within the range of ordinary behavior and whatever injury occurs isn’t because of unreasonable conduct.

Even though this case happened before the May 18 ruling in Pfenning, the intermediate panel unanimously found that the standard applies and it doesn’t matter whether Welch was a “participant” in determining liability. Still, the Pfenning decision didn’t offer any guidance on what might be “ordinary behavior” and that is what the Court of Appeals took up largely in this current appeal on the topic of breach of duty.

That meant exploring the actions of both Welch and the 11-year-old boy who swung the bat and hit her in the knee.

“Our Supreme Court offered little guidance in Pfenning as to the meaning of its new rule that ‘if the conduct of such participant [i.e. the alleged tortfeasor] is within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport, the conduct is reasonable as a matter of law and does not constitute a breach of duty,” Judge Melissa May wrote.

The appellate panel relied on caselaw from other states such as Hawaii and New Hampshire, as well as a 60-year-old Indiana Court of Appeals case involving a golfer taking practice swings away from the tee.

But questions remain in this case about where Welch was standing when she was injured, as well as whether the baseball game had actually started at the time. The court determined it couldn’t decide what might be reasonable, so it reversed and sent that back for the trial court to explore. Since Welch didn’t address the governmental immunity aspect in her briefing, the appellate court couldn’t say whether the trial court erred in that holding and affirmed it.

“The record before us presents issues of fact that will likely have a bearing on whether Jordan Young’s conduct when Welch was injured was within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in little league baseball. We must therefore reverse summary judgment for Young and remand,” the court wrote.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  2. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  3. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  4. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  5. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

ADVERTISEMENT