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COA: Breathalyzer certificate is not testimonial

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For the first time since the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2009 ruling that found a defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to confront the analysts who prepared lab certificates certifying the defendant had cocaine, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court did not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation by allowing the inspection certificate for a breathalyzer into evidence, even though the certifier of the equipment did not testify at trial.

In Francisco J. Ramirez v. State of Indiana, No. 65A01-0911-CR-543, finding the inspection certificate was not testimonial evidence within the purview of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the Court of Appeals affirmed Francisco J. Ramirez’s conviction of Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

On Oct. 18, 2008, Ramirez was arrested for drunk driving and failed a field sobriety test after he was pulled over by a Mount Vernon Police Department officer. The officer had observed Ramirez was swerving and used his radar to find Ramirez was driving 8 mph over the posted speed limit.

After he was pulled over, Ramirez failed three field sobriety tests. He then agreed to a breath test on a BAC DataMaster, which printed a ticket that showed his blood alcohol content was .09.

At trial, the state introduced Ramirez’ breath test results and an official certificate of compliance that verified the officer’s DataMaster had been examined Aug. 12, 2008, and had been found to satisfy the requirements of Department of Toxicology Regulations. The director at the Department of Toxicology had signed the certificate.

Ramirez argued because the certificate showed the DataMaster’s results would be accurate, not being able to cross-examine the certifier disqualified the DataMaster printout as evidence.

Following Crawford, and prior to Melendez-Diaz, the Court of Appeals continued to find that certificates of compliance for breathalyzers were not testimonial, according to today’s opinion for Ramirez.

“We reasoned in part that (1) the certificates are not prepared at a judicial proceeding or during police interrogation, Rembusch, 836 N.E.2d at 982, (2) the certificates are not sworn affidavits and do not contain formalized testimonial materials, id., and (3) although inspection certificates are prepared for purposes of criminal litigation, ‘certification of breath-test machines is removed from the direct investigation or direct proof of whether any particular defendant has operated a vehicle while intoxicated; the certificates are not prepared in anticipation of litigation in any particular case or with respect to implicating any specific defendant.’ Jarrell, 852 N.E.2d at 1026 (citations omitted),” Judge Nancy Vaidik wrote.

Following the decision of Melendez-Diaz, Judge Vaidik continued, the Court of Appeals still finds that the certificate for a breathalyzer is still not testimonial in nature. She cited the Supreme Court’s decision, which addressed certificates for lab equipment.

In her dissent, Senior Judge Betty Barteau agreed in result, but disagreed “with the majority’s conclusion that the State’s Certificate of Inspection and Compliance of Breath Test Instruments … is nontestimonial in nature. I therefore conclude that admission of that document violated Ramirez’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.”

Judge Barteau then compared the case to the 2009 Indiana Supreme Court decision Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009), in which the Indiana Supreme Court determined a certificate of analysis from a DNA lab technician was testimonial in nature, citing Melendez-Diaz.

Judge Barteau also wrote in the Ramirez case the error was harmless because there was enough other evidence for a jury to convict Ramirez of operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, based on the observations of the officer, who did testify at trial.
 

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  1. Judge Roger B. Cosbey is unethical and bias toward African American who seeks justice in Title VII claims. He disrespected and used his authority to attempt to intimidate me into taking an unfair settlement and when I refused he proceeded to get my case dismissed and to deny me my Constitutional and Civil Rights. He disobeying several rules of law; specifically, by ruling on summary judgment motions against the Fed. R. Civ. P., without authority of Judge William C. Lee, without consent of the attorneys, and with conspiracy to commit “fraud on the court,” as he conspired with my former attorney. He proved to me that he is bias, unethical, unfair and unfit to be reappointed. In my opinion, he should be disbarred in 2013, for committing fraud on the court, which would make him ineligible for reinstatement in 2014. See docket 3:07 cv 629 where he rules on dispositive motions, knowing magistrates are not vested with that power (especially without consent), grants the defendant an unconscionable number of extensions, accepts my former attorney request for extension for dispositive motion knowing he was working with the opposition, and unbelievably grants the defendant another extension after he requested an extension after he missed the deadline. I know another attorney filed charges against him for bias in race discrimination case(s). I know what he did in my case before he voluntarily recused himself, I just do not know how many other innocent people have been stripped of their rights because of him. I say shame on him and no more of the same.

  2. they are pushing these cases against lawyers too far. thought-crime.

  3. vagueness cannot challenged, so let's write all laws vaguely and throw the constitution out the window.Even if the court is operating under a particular law, if they don't it they will change it to their liking. What a joke!!!

  4. Two convictions becomes one conviction with exactly the same sentence, only it is not clear wheter or not that sentence will be 18 months, 120 months or 138 months. Actually if the guns were in a home, whether or not they were his, he is protected under the 2nd amendment. Jurors need to learn the law and the constitution before judging others. The cour5ts need to do this as well.

  5. With all due respect, Rick, I think you probably would be making a mistake by going to law school. The job market for attorneys is so saturated, you may well find yourself unemployed and with a lot of debt. You mention law would be a good supplement to your skills. True. But employers unfortunately don't value that. You will find that a law degree may well pigeonhole you into an attorney slot and limit career options. If you have a good job now I would hold onto that. As an attorney, you may well end up making less with the aforementioned debt.

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