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COA: Collateral estoppel not applicable

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The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence because the defendant couldn't prove collateral estoppel precluded the trial court from denying his motion.

In Joshua Perez-Grahovac v. State of Indiana, No. 22A05-0712-CR-703, Joshua Perez-Grahovac brought an interlocutory appeal, arguing because his roommate's motion to suppress evidence was granted, his motion should be granted, too.

Perez-Grahovac and his roommate, Angela Phillips, were arrested for various drug charges after police obtained a search warrant after a period of surveillance of their apartment, a trash pull of their residence, and Perez-Grahovac's previous statements to police that he was a cocaine dealer.

Perez-Grahovac filed his motion to suppress evidence because he believed the search violated the United States and Indiana Constitutions and the probable cause affidavit didn't contain sufficient facts. His motion was denied.

Phillips also filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court granted without conducting further hearings on the motion. The only evidence Perez-Grahovac introduced to support his motion to reconsider was Phillips' motion to suppress and the chronological case summary stating the court granted the motion.

Perez-Grahovac argues his motion should be granted based on Jennings v. State, 714 N.E.2d 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), but his case is distinguishable from Jennings. The state hadn't stipulated it had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the searches in Phillips' case or that the searches in the roommates' cases are the same. The trial court's grant of Phillips' motion doesn't include findings of fact or conclusions of law, so the appellate court can't determine whether the judge who granted Phillips's motion based her decision "upon an issue or fact other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration," wrote Judge Carr Darden, citing Jennings.

Perez-Grahovac didn't present a sufficient record to permit the appellate court to determine whether collateral estoppel should apply.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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