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COA: Courts need to consider proportionality of damages in restitution orders

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The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a Franklin Circuit judge’s decision to require a defendant to pay restitution and a fine after he entered into an open plea agreement on a burglary charge. But the judges instructed trial courts to consider apportioning the amount of restitution among co-perpetrators in relation to each person’s contribution to the victim’s loss.

Jesus Gil pleaded guilty in August 2012 to one count of Class B felony burglary pursuant to an unwritten plea agreement. In return, a second count of felony burglary was dismissed. The charges stemmed from his involvement in a home invasion in which jewelry and other items were taken in December 2010. Gil was sentenced by Franklin Circuit Judge J. Steven Cox to 12 years in the Department of Correction with two years suspended to probation. He was ordered to pay a $250 fine and the victims $20,000 in restitution, jointly and severally with the three other perpetrators.

Gil challenged the imposition of the fine and restitution order, the probation terms and his sentence in Jesus S. Gil v. State of Indiana, 24A04-1211-CR-603.  

The appellate judges affirmed Cox’s order that Gil must pay the fine and restitution because the open plea agreement left sentencing up to Cox’s discretion, but the COA did order a new hearing on the restitution. There wasn’t sufficient evidence that the victim suffered a loss of $20,000.

At the new hearing, Cox should consider whether imposing joint and several liability for the full amount of the restitution order is constitutionally proportionate under Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution to the nature of the offense committed by Gil when he only caused a portion of the damages and in relation to the sentences entered against the other co-defendants. The COA pointed out that all sentencing courts should consider these circumstances.

The trial court also abused its discretion by not specifying the conditions of Gil’s probation. The trial court failed to provide him a written statement of probation terms and, although the judge did orally indicate that no contact with the victim was a term of the probation, Gil never acknowledged he understood this as a term of his probation, Judge Paul Mathias wrote. The judges ordered Cox to enter written probation terms.

They also affirmed Gil’s sentence as appropriate given the nature of the offense and his character.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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