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COA: Destroyed tape doesn't make record silent

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The premature destruction of a tape of a guilty plea hearing by court staff doesn't render the record silent for purposes of Boykin, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled Monday. As a result, the appellate court reversed the grant of post-conviction relief to a defendant who claimed the destruction of his 1991 guilty plea hearing tape prevented meaningful review of the plea.

In State of Indiana v. Mark Damron, No. 49A04-0901-PC-29, the state appealed the post-conviction court's decision that a destroyed record is by its very definition silent, and that a waiver of Boykin rights, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969), can't be presumed from a silent record.

Mark Damron pleaded guilty to Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated in 1991; in January 2007, he filed his petition for post-conviction relief alleging his guilty plea wasn't knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because the trial court didn't keep a record of his guilty plea hearing. The tape of hearing was destroyed after 10 years, although the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure state that misdemeanor records can be destroyed after 10 years and felonies should be maintained for 55 years.

Boykin said courts can't presume a waiver of important federal rights from a silent record, but in Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 469, (Ind. 2006), the Indiana Supreme Court said that a lost record is not the per se equivalent of a silent record.

The Court of Appeals concluded as in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992), Damron was collaterally attacking his guilty plea. Parke ruled that "it defies logic to presume from the mere unavailability of a transcript... that the defendant was not advised of his rights."

"It appears that the trial court had a policy of destroying tapes after ten years, and without more we cannot equate this policy, although in contravention of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure, to governmental misconduct," wrote Judge Michael Barnes regarding Damron's case. "Given these facts, we cannot conclude that the presumption of regularity should not apply here."

Damron also failed to carry his burden of proof that he wasn't informed of his Boykin rights.

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

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  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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